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Executive summary  
1. Background 
• This research is part of a wider evaluation commissioned by the Department 
for Education (DfE) to assess the impact and perception of the recent reforms 
to teachers’ and leaders’ pay in England. The wider evaluation is led by the 
National Foundation for Educational Research (NFER), see Sharp et al., 
(2017), which surveyed teachers and headteachers with the purpose of 
gaining a clearer understanding of schools’ responses to the 2013 and 2014 
pay reforms. 
• This part of the evaluation used the Schools Workforce Census (SWC), a 
national administrative dataset on the pay of the school workforce, which 
covers the majority of primary and secondary schools in England. The report 
analyses the impact of the reforms on the level, variation and annual growth in 
pay, progression from the main to the upper teacher pay range, and teacher 
retention and mobility (DfE, 2016). 
2. The reforms to teachers’ and leaders’ pay 
• The reforms of relevance here are the introduction of Performance-Related 
Pay (PRP) for teachers and leaders in state-funded schools in England (DfE, 
2013a). A new system was introduced for determining teachers’ pay in 
England in September 2013, which affected pay decisions from September 
2014. Leaders’ pay was first affected by the reforms from September 2015. In 
general, these reforms mean that annual pay awards are now linked to 
performance rather than length of service, and school leaders have more 
flexibility in setting the salary of new teachers at the school. School leaders 
also have flexibility in designing the appraisal system used to measure 
‘performance’. ‘Spine points’ that determined the annual growth in salary within 
teacher pay ranges were removed from 2014, but ‘reference’ spine point levels 
have been produced by teaching unions.  
• PRP was introduced in England, citing research that shows that teacher 
effectiveness is a key determinant of pupil progress, particularly for 
disadvantaged pupils, and that teacher quality can be improved where 
appraisal systems provide effective incentives to teachers (DfE, 2012). The 
first necessary step for teacher effectiveness to increase as a result of these 
reforms is for schools to use their new powers to introduce meaningful PRP. 
Assuming that there is variation in teacher quality within and across schools, 
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this would be reflected in increased variation in teachers’ pay, and/or more 
effective teachers remaining in the sector following the reform.  
3. Methodology and caveats 
• The longitudinal SWC provided the opportunity to study teachers’ and leaders’ 
pay and annual pay awards between 2010 and 2015, using a sample of most 
primary and secondary schools in England.1 The analysis presented in this 
report therefore provides representative and comprehensive information to 
policy makers about the potential impact of the reforms to date, and areas to 
explore further in future. 
• The analysis presented here is descriptive, simply showing the main patterns 
of interest spanning the period immediately before and after the reforms 
(November 2010 to November 2015). There are three limitations of the SWC 
and the wider national context, which mean that the patterns and changes over 
time presented here should not be causally attributed to the reforms. These 
are: 
1. The national roll-out of the reforms means that any changes over time may 
be due to other factors, such as: 
a. Changes in the statutory conditions for teachers and leaders, from public 
sector pay restraint in 2011 and 2012 to statutory increases in the 
maxima and/or minima of the teacher pay ranges from 2013 onwards. 
2. Changes in the composition of schools and the school workforce over the 
period. For example, between 2010 and 2015, the percentage of males in 
the school workforce declined slightly, from 25.4% to 24.6%; and the 
average age declined slightly, from 40.1 years to 38.9 years.  
3. Significant changes to the way that the SWC recorded pay coincided with 
these reforms. Whilst these changes were accounted for in the analysis in a 
comprehensive way, it is not possible to determine the full extent that these 
changes have had on the figures presented. 
4. The SWC may not record all relevant school pay decisions. This is because 
(under the most pessimistic assumption) around 32% of classroom 
teachers in post for at least one year had not yet received their pay award 
decision by the census date in 2015. This is likely to create a lag in pay 
                                            
1 Employees of independent schools in England are not included in the SWC. Of schools included in 
the SWC, 99% (18,491 out of 18,637) of the primary and secondary schools are included in the 
analysis. The sample selection excludes schools where information on staff pay is missing for more 
than half of teachers and leaders. Full details on the sample selection are provided in Appendix 
Section 2. 
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awards, so that changes are observed every two years rather than every 
year, depressing the figures for annual pay awards presented here.  
• While the following findings are nationally representative and comprehensive, 
for the stated reasons above, one should exercise caution when interpreting 
the figures in relation to the reforms. Finally, any impacts of the reforms that 
occurred after the latest available data (November 2015) are not reflected in 
this report. 
4. Findings 
4.1. Level and variation of teachers’ and leaders’ pay 
• The level of pay for teachers and leaders declined slightly in real terms 
(accounting for inflation) between 2010 and 2015 (Section 3.1): 
• The average nominal base pay of teachers increased very slightly between 
2010 and 2015. Once adjusted for inflation, this equates to a real terms 
decrease in base pay for teachers of around 2%. Over the same period the 
average base pay for leaders rose slightly, which equates to a real terms 
decrease of around 1%.  
• The very small increase in nominal base pay for teachers across the period 
has been partly offset by a small decline in the prevalence of additional 
payments for teachers, from around 38% receiving an additional payment in 
2013, to around 36% in 2015.2 The average value for those that receive an 
additional payment has remained similar (although slightly lower than the 
value before the reforms).  
• The decline in the use of additional payments means that teachers that no 
longer receive an additional payment will have a larger decrease in total pay 
than the decrease in base pay reported above. 
• There is limited evidence that the variation of teachers’ and leaders’ pay 
has changed as a result of the reforms up to 2015 (Section 3.2): 
• The variation of teachers’ and leaders’ pay changed over time, but these 
changes were small (in the case of teachers) and not clearly related to the 
timing of the reforms (for leaders).  
                                            
2 Total additional pay is defined as the sum of four components of additional pay: Special Educational 
Needs (SEN) allowances, recruitment and retention allowances, teaching and learning 
responsibilities, and other. Note that General Teaching Council for England (GTC) additional 
payments are not included for any years, as these payments are not relevant after 2012. Further 
details can be found in the Appendix 3.3. 
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4.2. Variation in annual pay awards 
• Variation in the annual pay awards for teachers has increased following 
the reforms up to 2015, although not universally (Section 4): 
• Annual pay awards for teachers changed over time. This is partly due to 
recommendations from the School Teachers’ Review Body (STRB) to 
increase the maxima and/or minima of the teacher pay ranges and 
consequent changes in the School Teachers’ Pay and Conditions Document 
(STPCD), in addition to any effect of the reforms to teachers’ pay (DfE, 
2012). 
• Many schools, when they did increase teacher pay, were still awarding 
annual increases in line with (now purely reference) spine points, 
suggesting that the existing pay ranges and points in operation before the 
reforms were still used. However, the increase in variation around these 
reference spine points suggests that at least some schools had moved 
away from using these reference points.  
• Increases between reference spine points for the upper pay range were 
between 3% and 4%. The proportion of teachers on the upper pay range 
being awarded a pay increase in line with these spine point increases, 
declined from 27% for pay awards between 2010 and 2011 to 12% for pay 
awards between 2014 and 2015.   
• Increases between reference spine points for the main pay range were 
largely between 7% and 8%. The proportion of teachers on the main pay 
range being awarded a pay increase in line with these spine point 
increases, declined from 50% for pay awards between 2010 and 2011 to 
22% for pay awards between 2014 and 2015. This decrease was due to 
some teachers receiving less than the typical 7% and 8% and some 
receiving more. 
•  There is large variation in the use of reference spine points across the 
country. In some local authorities, around 60% of teachers had changes in 
pay consistent with movement up the reference spine points, compared to 
other local authorities with less than 10%. 
• The combination of increased variation in teachers’ annual pay awards and 
a largely flat average level of teachers’ pay, implies that some teachers are 
experiencing lower pay awards than before the reform, while others are 
experiencing higher pay awards.  
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4.3. Teacher mobility and ‘pay portability’ 
• Teachers’ salaries upon starting at a new school have been affected by 
the removal of ‘pay portability’3 as a statutory requirement up to 2015 
(Section 5): 
• Some schools seemed to be using the flexibility in starting salaries to offer 
lower salaries to new teachers in equivalent positions. The proportion of 
teachers that moved schools to an equivalent position and received a lower 
nominal salary increased after the reforms, from 5.5% of moving teachers to 
equivalent positions between 2012 and 2013, to around 9% between 2013 
and 2014, and 7.4% between 2014 and 2015, although this still affected 
only a small proportion of teachers.  
• There was a larger increase in the proportion of teachers that moved 
schools to an equivalent position and received a nominal base pay 
equivalent to a lower reference spine point. This is because reference spine 
points increased between years, while nominal base pay could remain 
constant. 
• There were increases in the percentage of teachers that left their school 
each year between 2010 and 2015. This was reflected in increases in the 
percentage of teachers that moved between state-funded schools in 
England each year from 2010 to 2015. However, these patterns are more 
consistent with a general time trend than any effect of the reforms on the 
size and composition of the teacher workforce.  
4.4. Progression from main to upper pay range 
• There is some evidence of increased flexibility in progression across pay 
ranges up to 2015 (Section 6): 
• Progression from the main to upper pay range for teachers has stayed 
roughly constant over time, between roughly 12% and 13% each year. 
Those at the top of the main pay range were more likely to receive 
progression to the upper pay range than those below the top. For example, 
between 2010 and 2011, 35.5% of those at the top of the main pay range 
progressed to the upper pay range, compared to 2.7% of those below the 
top of the main pay range.  
• Those below the top of the main pay range had the largest growth in 
progression to the upper pay range across the period (2.7% between 2010 
and 2011 to 7.8% between 2014 and 2015). This possibly reflects more 
flexibility in teachers’ pay and progression as a result of the reforms, as 
                                            
3 The term ‘pay portability’ refers to the requirement for schools to match the spine point teachers 
received at their previous school. 
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teachers are less rigidly paid according to typical (now reference) spine 
point progression. 
4.5. Equity concerns 
• The research findings do not support the equity concerns about the effect 
of PRP for teachers, although further research is required to explore this more 
carefully: 
• The introduction of PRP for teachers was accompanied by concerns from 
teachers’ unions that the progression of female teachers relative to male 
teachers, and ethnic minority teachers relative to White British teachers 
would be unfairly disadvantaged (ATL, 2015; NASUWT, 2015).  
• This report explores the patterns in the level and variation of teachers’ pay 
and the level and variation in annual pay awards for female and minority 
ethnic teachers. In general, there is little evidence that particular groups 
have been disadvantaged as a result of the reforms to teachers’ pay. 
However, it is beyond the scope of this technical appendix to conclusively 
state if this was the case. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
These analyses have been commissioned by the Department for Education (DfE) as 
part of a wider evaluation to assess the impact and perception of the reforms to 
teachers’ and leaders’ pay in England. This evaluation is led by the National 
Foundation for Educational Research (NFER) – see Sharp et al., (2017). The main 
purpose of this research is to gain a clear understanding of schools’ responses to the 
2013 and 2014 pay reforms, in particular:  
• Track schools’ progress with implementing pay reforms and identify areas of 
best practice  
• Understand resulting changes in schools’ behaviour in relation to pay award 
and progression between the main and upper pay range 
• Explore perceptions of the reforms amongst teachers and school leaders  
• Explore whether the reforms are influencing behaviour in relation to pay award 
and progression amongst academies and free schools  
• Understand the reasons underlying schools’ decisions to implement pay 
freedoms or choosing not to do so, and  
• Identify examples of innovative practice and establish their perceived benefits 
and challenges.  
This technical appendix is an addendum to the main report. The School Workforce 
Census (SWC), (DfE, 2016) national administrative data on the pay of the school 
workforce in England, was analysed to consider the impact of the reforms on 
teachers’ pay and annual growth in pay, progression from the main to the upper pay 
range, and teacher mobility, across the majority of primary and secondary schools in 
England.4 The analysis presented here is descriptive, simply showing the main 
patterns of interest spanning the period immediately before and after the reforms 
(November 2010 to November 2015). There are three limitations of the SWC and the 
wider national context, which mean that the patterns and changes over time 
presented here should not be causally attributed to the reforms. These are: 
1. The national roll-out of the reforms means that any changes over time may be 
due to other factors, such as: 
                                            
4 Employees of independent schools in England are not included in the SWC. Of schools included in 
the SWC, 99% (18,491 out of 18,637) of the primary and secondary schools that submitted data to 
the SWC in England are included in the analysis. The sample selection excludes schools where 
information on staff pay is missing for more than half of teachers and leaders. Full details on the 
sample selection are provided in Appendix Section 2. 
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a. Changes in the statutory conditions for teachers and leaders, from public 
sector pay restraint in 2011 and 2012 to statutory increases in the maxima 
and/or minima of the teacher pay ranges from 2013 onwards. 
b. Changes in the composition of schools and the school workforce over the 
period. For example, between 2010 and 2015, the percentage of males in 
the school workforce declined slightly, from 25.4% to 24.6%; and the 
average age declined slightly, from 40.1 years to 38.9 years.  
2. Significant changes to the way that the SWC recorded pay coincided with 
these reforms. Whilst these changes were accounted for in the analysis in a 
comprehensive way, it is not possible to determine the full extent that these 
changes have had on the figures presented. 
3. The SWC may not record all relevant school pay decisions. This is because 
(under the most pessimistic assumption) around 32% of classroom teachers 
in post for at least one year had not yet received their pay award decision by 
the census date in 2015. This is likely to create a lag in pay awards, so that 
changes are observed every two years rather than every year, depressing the 
figures for annual pay awards presented here.  
While the following findings are nationally representative and comprehensive, for the 
stated reasons above, one should exercise caution when interpreting the figures in 
relation to the reforms. Finally, any impacts of the reforms that occurred after the 
latest available data (November 2015) are not reflected in this analysis.  
The research questions are described in more detail below.  
1.2. Prior research  
PRP for teachers was introduced in England in 2013. The main reason given for its 
introduction (DfE, 2012) was research evidence showing that teacher effectiveness 
is a key determinant of pupil progress, particularly for disadvantaged pupils, and that 
teacher quality can be improved where appraisal systems provide effective 
incentives for improving pupil performance.  
Research evidence supports the claim that teacher effectiveness (or quality) has a 
large influence on pupil progress. The typical result found in studies by economists is 
remarkably consistent: a one standard deviation change in teacher effectiveness 
yields a 10% - 20% standard deviation change in pupil attainment (Burgess, 2015). 
This appears to be true across different stages of school, different subjects (though it 
is typically greater in maths) and (to the extent there is evidence) across different 
countries (Burgess, 2015). An alternative way of expressing the difference is in terms 
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of years of achievement gain; using this method the difference produced by effective 
teachers is equivalent to “some teachers producing 1.5 years of gain in achievement 
in an academic year while others with equivalent students produce only 1/2 year of 
gain” (Hanushek, 2011). 
The evidence for whether PRP linked to an appraisal system improves teacher 
effectiveness is less consistent. In theory, PRP can improve teacher quality through 
two mechanisms: first, raising individual productivity as incentives are more aligned 
with teachers’ ‘effort’; second, selecting and retaining more productive workers as 
they choose to work in occupations with PRP. There are a number of issues that 
complicate the effect of PRP in the public sector, however - see Dixit (2002) and 
Burgess and Ratto (2003). Relevant to teachers, these include multi-tasking and 
output measurement problems: there are multiple dimensions of teachers’ ‘effort’, for 
example, preparing for classes, providing feedback through marking, and non-
academic support, but only limited scope to measure the effect of effort on multiple 
pupil outcomes. These problems can lead to unintended consequences, for example 
substituting teachers’ effort away from non-measurable activities (Neal, 2011). Jacob 
(2005) studied the introduction of ‘No Child Left Behind’ (NCLB) accountability in 
Chicago Public Schools and found that teachers reacted strategically to the 
incentives, including substituting teaching time towards the tested subjects and away 
from others, and also by increasing special education placements. Teachers might 
focus narrowly on the rewarded measure, rather than a ‘true’ aim of education. This 
is often described as ‘teaching to the test’. Another issue is ‘multiple principals’, 
where PRP reduces collaboration between colleagues at the detriment to pupil 
outcomes.  Finally, it is argued that providing monetary incentives for teachers can 
undermine their intrinsic motivation to do their best for their pupils. 
It is, then, an empirical question whether the introduction of performance-related 
schemes raise or reduce pupil attainment; see recent surveys in Neal (2011) and 
Jackson et al., (2014).5 The brief answer is that there are robust well-designed 
studies yielding both answers. It is very hard to be able to introduce a PRP scheme 
that admits an experimental evaluation, including the recent reforms in England. 
There are therefore relatively few studies credibly estimating a causal effect.  
In an attempt to side step the issue of experimental evaluation of PRP systems, 
Rothstein (2015) applied a range of parameters found in the existing literature to 
simulate teacher labour markets. In these simplified models, which replicated a 
range of PRP systems, he found that they can improve selection into and out of the 
                                            
5 These reviews find a range of impacts for PRP in the US. Positive impacts were found by Winters et 
al., (2008) in Arkansas. Negligible impacts were found by: Springer et al. (2010) in Tennessee; 
Goodman and Turner (2010) in New York; Springer, Pane et al. (2012) in Round Rock, Texas; 
Goldhaber and Walch (2012) in Denver, Colorado; and Glazerman and Seifullah (2010) in Chicago). 
Negative impacts were found by Fryer (2013) in New York.  
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profession, but annual bonuses only have small effects, in comparison to reductions 
in initial tenure rates for new teachers.   
This report is concerned with the first necessary step for PRP reforms to affect pupil 
attainment: did the pay reforms actually affect the level and distribution of teachers’ 
pay, and/or change the composition of the teacher workforce? These are relevant 
and non-trivial questions to ask because the change in regulations was very general 
and deliberately non-prescriptive, with each school designing its own policies. This 
means it is possible that only minimal changes were implemented. The reforms in 
England are described in more detail in the following sections, and the specific 
research questions are outlined below. 
1.3. The reforms and pay review body context  
In 2012, the Secretary of State for Education asked the School Teachers’ Review 
Body (STRB) to review current provisions for teachers’ pay, aiming to raise the 
status of the profession and improve the quality of teaching in schools. The case for 
change was presented in the context of research evidence showing that teacher 
effectiveness is a key determinant of pupil progress, particularly for disadvantaged 
pupils (DfE, 2012). 
The STRB (DfE, 2012) recommended a broad national pay framework, establishing 
minima and maxima for teacher and leadership pay ranges and the main additional 
responsibility allowances. This framework defines the areas within which schools are 
free to make their own decisions, such as setting recruitment and retention 
allowances, and making individual pay decisions. Key recommendations focused on 
replacing increments based on length of service with progression linked to annual 
appraisal. A new system was introduced for determining teachers’ pay in England in 
September 2013, which affected pay decisions from September 2014. The main 
changes as described by Government are (DfE, 2013a): 
• all pay awards are now linked to performance and not length of service 
• schools can increase individual teachers’ pay at different rates based on their 
performance 
• there are new criteria for progression from the main to the upper pay range 
instead of the threshold test 
• introducing a pay range for leading practitioners who will improve teaching 
skills across the profession 
• more freedom for schools to set the starting salaries of teachers new to the 
school 
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• schools no longer have to match a teacher’s existing salary when recruiting 
staff (relaxing ‘pay portability’) 
The first three points clearly signal a major shift in emphasis, away from simple 
regular moves up a fixed pay scale known as spine points within the teacher and 
leader pay ranges, to a world where pay depends explicitly on performance. Another 
important provision is the ending of ‘pay portability’ described in the last two points – 
schools no longer need to match a moving teacher’s current pay. Further reforms 
came into force in September 2014, which extended the same principle of greater 
autonomy at school level to the pay of school leaders (head teachers, deputy heads 
and assistant heads). 
One of the key features of these reforms is the deliberately non-prescriptive way in 
which it was introduced. DfE issued advice to schools (DfE, 2013b) which, while 
providing a framework, was largely non-prescriptive and encouraged schools to 
make appropriate choices on how best to implement the reforms. Note also that 
‘performance’ itself is left for schools to define in their appraisal policies. 
The effect of the reforms to teachers’ and leaders’ pay must be considered carefully 
alongside the public sector pay freeze, which affected pay in 2011 and 2012, and 
recommendations made by the STRB for the adjustments made to pay ranges for 
classroom teachers and leaders that coincided with the reform. A summary of these 
recommendations is shown in Table 1. In contrast to 2011 and 2012, all teachers in 
post on or after 1 September 2013 were awarded a 1% pay uplift, and the statutory 
minima and maxima of the main and upper pay ranges for classroom teachers were 
increased by 1% from September 2014. Teachers within the minima and maxima of 
the pay ranges in September 2014 and 2015 were not obliged to receive a 1% uplift 
in pay. From 2014, the discretionary national reference points (known as spine 
points) were removed from departmental advice, with the aim of moving pay awards 
away from the typical level of pay progression before the reforms to teachers’ pay. 
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Table 1 Summary of changes recommended by the School Teachers’ Review Body (2009 to 2015) 
Year Pay Pay ranges Other 
2009a 2.3% An adjustment to the main and 
upper pay scale for Inner 
London (as proposed in 17th 
report) 
 
2010b 2.3%   
2011c 0% (public sector pay freeze) Non-consolidated payment of 
£250 for those earning below 
£21,000 (unqualified teachers) 
Overall limit on discretions 
that can be applied to head 
teachers’ pay.  
2012 0% (public sector pay freeze)   
2013d Classroom teachers’ pay and allowances uprated by 1%.   
2014 Statutory minima and maxima for classroom teachers’ pay 
uprated by 1%. 
 
 
 Discretionary national 
reference points removed 
from Departmental advice. 
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Year Pay Pay ranges Other 
2015e Uplift of 1% to the minima of the main pay range, leadership 
pay range and the eight head teacher group pay ranges. 
Uplift of 2% to the maxima of the main pay range. 
Uplift of 1% to the minima and maxima of all other 
classroom teacher pay ranges, the allowances in the 
national pay framework (Teaching and Learning 
Responsibilities (TLRs) and Special Educational Need 
(SEN)) 
No uplift to the maxima of the leadership pay range nor to 
any of the eight head teacher group pay ranges. 
  
Source: a School Teachers’ Review Body Eighteenth Report Part One - 2009 and School Teachers’ Review Body Eighteenth Report Part Two - 2009 
b School Teachers’ Review Body Nineteenth Report - 2010 
c School Teachers’ Review Body Twentieth Report – 2011 
d School Teachers’ Pay and Conditions Document 2013 and Guidance on School Teachers’ Pay and Conditions September 2013  
e School Teachers’ Review Body Twenty-Fifth Report – 2015 
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1.4. Teachers’ and leaders’ reaction to the reforms 
The decentralising nature of the pay reforms means that the opinions of teachers 
and school management regarding the nature of PRP will play an important role in 
how the reforms were, and continue to be, implemented. The last survey of teacher 
opinions on this subject before the reforms came into effect was in August 2013 
(Policy Exchange, 2013). This found teachers were open to PRP, with 89% of 
teachers agreeing that the ‘quality of their teaching should be important in driving 
teacher's pay and progression’. This reduced to 66% when linking pay directly to 
student progress.  
Within a few months of the reforms coming into effect, but before any school had 
made their first pay decisions under the new pay framework, the majority of teachers 
had their performance assessed against the Teachers’ Standards and objectives set 
by the school. Teachers were equally divided in their opinions of the usefulness of 
these standards to provide a fair basis for recommendations for their pay (O’Beirne 
and Pyle, 2014). However, this masks a large difference between senior leaders and 
classroom teachers, with 66% of senior leaders thinking that the standards were an 
appropriate basis for making decisions about pay, compared to 36% of classroom 
teachers (O’Beirne and Pyle, 2014). A divergence of opinions was also present in 
teachers’ views on performance pay in general. Whilst the majority of teachers felt 
that they understood the new arrangements, and more teachers agreed than not that 
the pay of individual teachers should be on the basis of their performance rather than 
length of service (48%  to 38%), nearly half of teachers thought that the new pay 
arrangements would not reward them appropriately for the quality of their teaching 
(O’Beirne and Pyle, 2014). 
Similar concerns about the new pay arrangements are reported by Marsden (2015), 
who surveyed over 4,000 teachers and 200 school leaders between January and 
April 2014. In this survey only 24% of teachers agreed that linking pay progression to 
performance is good in principle. Teachers’ reasons for why the new PRP 
programme will not work were due to: 1) the difficulty of linking work done to 
individual teacher performance (87%); 2) schools not having sufficient funds to 
reward good performance (73%); and 3) the perception that leaders will reward their 
favourite teachers (70%). 
Teacher unions also voiced their opinions on the reforms through surveying their 
members. Note: these responses may not be representative of all teachers, or 
indeed all members of these unions. At the end of 2014, the National Union of 
Teachers (NUT) surveyed its members and received responses from 5,000, of whom 
half thought the reforms were ‘unfair’ (Education Journal, 2015). A year on, the most 
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recent survey of 10,000 teachers carried out by the Association of Teachers and 
Lecturers (ATL) and the NUT, found that this had decreased slightly to 43% (NUT 
and ATL, 2017). A related questioned asked by the National Association of 
Schoolmasters Union of Women Teachers (NASUWT) in February 2015 of 16,000 
teachers and leaders, found that only 38% believed that they had received the pay 
progression which they were entitled to within the last twelve months (NASUWT, 
2015). Note the results from NASUWT survey would also reflect pay progression 
generally, rather than the specifics of the reforms.  
In the summer of 2016, the DfE commissioned the NFER to survey a representative 
sample of teachers as part of the Teacher Voice Omnibus Survey (Smith et al., 
2017). Respondents were asked what had been the outcome of their last annual 
performance review in terms of pay progression. Overall, over a third of teachers 
surveyed (37%) were ineligible for pay progression as they were at the top of the 
scale, whilst just under half (46%) reported their pay progression had been 
recommended and awarded. Only 8% of respondents said that their pay progression 
had been recommended but not awarded, and 5% stated they had not been 
recommended for pay progression. 
The teacher union surveys also reflect concerns among teachers about the reforms’ 
potential for bias and discrimination (NASUWT, 2015). Both the NASUWT and ATL 
surveys highlighted a concern that Black teachers were more likely to be denied 
progression than white British teachers. Moreover, a previous survey of ATL 
members in 2015 (ATL, 2015), highlighted concerns of gender discrimination, finding 
male teachers progressed at a higher rate than female teachers (53.7% versus 
37.7%) and that 40% of male teachers reported receiving a higher salary at their new 
school for a similar role, compared to only 12.1% of female teachers. 
Statements from teacher and leadership unions suggest that the majority of schools 
have implemented the minimum required pay reforms. For example, in their 
submission to the 26th STRB, the National Association of Head Teachers (NAHT, 
2015) emphasised that its ‘members have largely chosen to continue to use the 
existing pay scales and points that existed in STPCD 2013’. Therefore, despite the 
flexibility, they, along with other teaching unions, have continued to publish and use 
reference pay points that include points within the minimum and maximum of the pay 
ranges, and that increase in line with the STRB recommendations for increases to 
the minimum and maximum of the pay ranges. This opinion was shared by the 
General Secretary of the NUT who stated “Results depend upon the work of the 
whole school, not just individuals. Paying one teacher more than another can be very 
divisive and lead to unnecessary disputes. Equally, schools do not want or need the 
additional cost and bureaucracy of working out individual pay for teachers, and for 
this reason many have kept to the national pay scales.” (NUT, 2016). 
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1.5. Research questions 
This report considers the impact of the reforms on teachers’ pay and annual change 
in pay, progression from the main to the upper pay range, and teacher mobility, 
across the majority of primary and secondary schools in England. Full-time 
equivalent nominal base pay is used throughout the report, which separates changes 
in pay from changes in working hours for teachers and leaders. The research 
questions for this part of the study are outlined below. 
1.5.1. Teachers’ Pay  
After the reforms, teachers’ pay is no longer required to follow defined spine points 
within pay ranges, and pay increases are at the discretion of the head teacher, 
dependent on performance. The hypothesis investigated here, therefore, is that the 
reforms increased the variance in teacher pay, and potentially reduced the level of 
teacher pay, on average. In order to examine this, the following statistics for 
November 2010 to November 2015 are presented:  
• Teachers’ and leaders’ average full-time equivalent nominal base pay across 
school type and individual characteristics 
• The variance in teachers’ and leaders’ full-time equivalent nominal base pay 
by age and across school type and individual characteristics 
• The within- and between-school variance in teachers’ and leaders’ full-time 
equivalent nominal base pay. 
1.5.2. Teachers’ Annual Change in Full-time Equivalent Nominal 
Pay 
The reforms included the removal of defined spine points and ‘automatic 
progression’ between these spine points within pay ranges. The report therefore 
explores the hypothesis that the reforms reduced the likelihood of teachers receiving 
an annual increase in full-time equivalent nominal base pay similar to that expected 
under the old system. In order to examine this, the following statistics on the annual 
growth of teacher pay for between 2010 and 2011 through to between 2014 and 
2015 are presented: 
• The likelihood of an annual increase in full-time equivalent nominal pay for 
individual teachers 
• The likelihood of an annual increase in full-time equivalent nominal pay for 
teachers mirroring the increase that would have been expected under the old 
system of spine point progression within a teacher pay range.  
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• The likelihood of this “expected” annual increase in full-time equivalent nominal 
pay across school types and individual characteristics 
• The within- and between-school variance in teachers’ annual change in full-
time equivalent nominal pay. 
1.5.3. Teachers’ Mobility 
After the reforms, schools could choose to relax the previous requirement of ‘pay 
portability’. This means that a teacher’s salary in a new school could be lower (as 
well as equal or higher) than their previous salary. This could affect mobility across 
schools, as schools are now more willing to hire new teachers, or teachers are now 
more reluctant to move schools. The reforms could also affect mobility and retention 
of teachers if PRP is used in conjunction with recruitment and retention allowances. 
The hypothesis investigated is that the reforms changed the mobility of teachers 
across schools, and that a higher proportion of teachers who move school have 
lower pay after moving schools. In order to examine this, the following statistics on 
teacher mobility between 2010 and 2011 through to between 2014 and 2015 are 
presented: 
• Teacher mobility across school type and individual characteristics 
• The percentage of teachers that move schools moving to a lower reference 
spine point, which refers to a spine point within the main and upper pay ranges 
before the reforms, and the reference spine points (uprated by 1%) provided 
by teachers’ unions after the reforms  
• The percentage of teachers that move schools moving to a lower reference 
spine point and lower nominal base pay.  
1.5.4. Progression to Upper Pay Range 
After the reforms, schools could introduce new criteria for progression from the main 
to the upper pay range instead of the existing threshold test. The hypothesis 
investigated, therefore, is that the reforms changed the likelihood of teachers 
progressing to the upper pay range. In order to examine this, the following statistic 
between 2010 and 2011 through to between 2014 and 2015 is presented: 
• The percentage of teachers with annual progression to the upper pay range 
from the main pay range across school type and individual characteristics 
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2. Data: School Workforce Census (SWC) 
The School Workforce Census (SWC) consists of individual-role level data on all 
staff from all local authorities (LAs) and state-funded schools in England (including 
academy and LA maintained schools). The census is co-ordinated by DfE. The first 
full sweep took place on 4th November 2010, and takes place on the first Thursday 
of November thereafter. It is a statutory requirement on schools and LAs to submit 
the SWC return, with data being supplied from either schools or LAs, or a 
combination of the two. The latest available data are from November 2015. This 
means that relevant information on pay and mobility is available for two years after 
the reforms would be expected to influence these factors for teachers, and one year 
for leaders. It would be possible to update the analysis presented below using future 
waves of the SWC to explore the emerging trends over time.  
This research uses the longitudinal version of the SWC, which has been created by 
DfE for individuals with a post defined as a teacher or leader. The longitudinal SWC 
links teachers and leaders observed in multiple annual school censuses. The SWC 
assigns each teacher an anonymous unique reference number, which allows 
researchers to follow individuals (without revealing their names) over multiple years. 
This means that that changes in all aspects of their contract and presence in state-
funded schools in England over time can be analysed. 
There are two important limitations to the SWC data, which should be kept in mind 
throughout the report. First, significant changes to the way that the SWC recorded 
pay coincided with these reforms. Whilst these changes were accounted for in a 
comprehensive way in the analysis, it is not possible to determine the full extent that 
these changes have had on the figures presented. 
Second, the SWC may not record all relevant school pay decisions. This is because 
(under the most pessimistic assumption) around 32% of classroom teachers in post 
for at least one year had not yet received their pay award decision by the census 
date in 2015. This is likely to create a lag in pay awards, so that changes are 
observed every two years rather than every year, depressing the figures for annual 
pay awards presented here. 
The longitudinal SWC dataset has 2,923,109 observations from 20,115 schools, 
including information on 650,501 teachers and 70,697 leaders. The census includes 
contract information such as the start date, hours worked, annual pay and all roles 
an individual has within a school (teacher, head of department, lunch time supervisor 
etc.), as well as an indicator for whether the member of staff is employed by the LA 
or the school they are working at. It also includes personal characteristics such as 
date of birth, gender and ethnicity, an indicator of whether a teacher has attained 
qualified teacher status (QTS), information on subject studied and the level of 
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qualification (degree, PGCE etc.), as well as on the amount of time spent in the 
classroom teaching each subject (it does not include names). In order to protect 
teacher confidentiality, these data was stored on encrypted secure servers and 
access was limited to two researchers who had been specifically trained and vetted. 
The final sample used for analysis contained 2,557,496 observations from 18,491 
primary and secondary schools including information on 574,270 teachers and 
59,144 leaders. This final dataset is described fully in Appendix 2 and in brief below. 
Teachers and leaders are defined in line with DfE guidance.6 Some ‘cleaning’ of the 
longitudinal data was required, and is described in full in Appendix 3. Complete Stata 
syntax is also available from the authors on request. The main steps to achieve the 
dataset used for analysis were: 
1. Create consistent school identifiers over time: this ensures that changes in 
school governance associated with changes in school identifiers are not confused 
with teachers’ moves across school in the analysis. Although school identifiers are 
consistent over time, school status as academy or non-academy school can vary 
over time. 
2. Clean nominal base pay: this removes erroneous values of nominal base pay 
in the longitudinal SWC data, therefore presenting a more representative picture of 
teachers’ and leaders’ pay over the period. This was particularly necessary in 2010 
(the first year of data collection) and 2013 (where the method of data collection 
changed). All cleaning of nominal base pay is subject to the reasonable assumptions 
described in detail in Appendix 3.1. Full-time equivalent nominal base pay is used 
throughout the report. 
3. Clean additional pay: this removes erroneous values of additional pay in the 
longitudinal SWC data, therefore presenting a more representative picture of 
teachers’ and leaders’ additional pay over the period. All cleaning of additional pay is 
subject to the reasonable assumptions described in detail in Appendix 3.2.  
The final sample used in the analysis excludes those with erroneous values of 
nominal base pay that couldn’t be reasonably adjusted. The final sample also 
includes: only schools classified as primary and secondary schools; excludes special 
schools, LA nursery schools, pupil referral units, studio schools and university 
technical colleges; includes only schools with more than 50% of (recoded) base pay  
                                            
6 Teacher: Advanced Skills Teachers, classroom teacher (upper pay range and main pay range), 
Excellent Teacher and Leading Practitioner. Leader: Advisory Teacher, Assistant Head, Deputy Head, 
Executive Head, Head 
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observed; includes individuals aged 22 and above and 62 and below7; includes 
individuals who work at least five hours per week and at least five weeks per year. 
The numbers of observations dropped in each stage of this sample selection are 
given in Appendix 2. 
                                            
7 These ages are chosen as age 22 corresponds to the 1st percentile and age 62 corresponds to the 
99th percentile. This means that 1% of the sample with the lowest recorded age in the longitudinal 
SWC and 1% of the sample with the highest recorded age in the longitudinal SWC are excluded from 
the analysis. This decision was taken to remove observations with recorded ages at the extremes of 
the age distribution.  
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3. Level and variation of teachers’ pay in England 
3.1. The level of teachers’ and leaders’ pay 
This section considers the level of teachers’ and leaders’ pay in England, as 
recorded in the longitudinal SWC. First, a general picture of pay is presented, shown 
according to teachers’ and leaders’ ages and across years spanning the pay reform. 
This informs whether there have been general trends in pay across the age 
distribution, which is used as a proxy for the distribution of teaching experience. 
Second, a more detailed description of average pay across school types, teacher 
and leader types, and years is presented. This informs whether there have been 
particularly noticeable increases in particular circumstances. In both cases, however, 
it is not possible to distinguish the effect of the PRP reforms from the effect of 
recommendations on base pay from the STRB.  
3.1.1. Average teacher and leader pay across teaching tenure/age 
Figure 1 shows the base pay for teachers for one time period before the reforms 
(November 2012) and one time period after the reforms (November 2015). The 
distribution is shown according to teachers’ age, which is used as a proxy for years 
of teaching as this information is not consistently reported in the SWC.  
Figure 1 (and all figures and tables throughout the report) use full-time equivalent 
(FTE) base pay in nominal terms. This means that changes over time do not conflate 
changes in hourly pay and changes in working hours. The general pattern across 
both years is a steep earnings gradient for younger teachers, rising on average 
around £1,000 per year of age to age 30, to a base pay which roughly corresponds 
to the maximum of the main pay range outside London, followed by a shallower 
earnings gradient.  
There is a clear increase in base pay across the middle and upper part of the age 
distribution over time. For example, average base pay for teachers aged 40 in 2015 
was around £35,700, compared to around £34,600 for teachers aged 40 in 2012. In 
real terms this equates to a small decrease of around 0.1% over the period for this 
age group.8   
  
                                            
8 Real terms change calculated using the Consumer Price Index available from the Office for National 
Statistics. The change in teachers’ base pay at age 40 is equivalent to a 3.1% increase and inflation 
increased by 3.2% over the same period.  
28 
 
Figure 1: Average base pay (full-time equivalent base pay) for teachers in England in 2012 and 
2015 (£1,000s) 
 
 
Note: Figures based on final analysis sample described in Appendix 2, for teachers only. The dashed 
horizontal lines show the bottom of the main pay range, top of the main pay range, and top of the 
upper pay range in 2015 for reference. 
Source: Longitudinal SWC. 
Figure 2 presents the equivalent picture for leaders. In contrast to the picture for 
teachers, the increase in base pay across ages is roughly constant, increasing from 
around £45,000 for leaders aged 30 to around £60,000 for leaders aged 60. 
Focusing on the change over time, there is an increase of around £1,500 on average 
across the entire period, across the age distribution. For example, for leaders age 
40, pay increased from an average of £52,500 in 2012 to £54,300 in 2015. Despite 
the nominal increase, this is equivalent to a decrease of around 0.3% in real terms. 
This suggests that the reform has led to increases in base pay for leaders, but it is 
impossible to distinguish the effect of the pay reforms from the effect of guidance 
from the STRB through this figure. Section 3.2 considers the effect of the pay 
reforms on the variation in pay, which is more likely to be directly attributed to the 
reform. 
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Figure 2: Average base pay (full-time equivalent base pay) for leaders in England in 2012 and 
2015 (£1,000s) 
 
 
Note: Figures based on final analysis sample described in Appendix 2, for leaders only, additionally 
excluding leaders with age 27 or below as there are less than 500 observations per age group. 
Source: Longitudinal SWC. 
3.1.2. Average teachers’ pay across school type and individual 
characteristics 
3.1.2.1. Teachers’ pay 
Table 2 shows the average level of teachers’ base pay across all available years of 
the SWC, for all teachers, and then for teachers in particular school types and 
particular characteristics. For all teachers as a whole, average nominal pay is almost 
constant across years: around £32,600 in 2010 and £33,000 in 2015. The majority of 
this slight increase in nominal pay for teachers, on average, is due to the increase 
between 2012 and 2015. This is consistent with the STRB recommendations that at 
least teachers at the minima or maxima of a teacher pay range received a 1% 
increase from 2013.   
3.1.2.2. Teachers’ pay across school types 
Considering the differences across school types, there is a slight increase across 
years for secondary school teachers, from £33,000 in 2010 to £33,800 in 2015, 
which begins from 2013. It’s not possible to say whether this is due to the PRP 
reform, or recommendations from the STRB. The increase in secondary rather than 
primary schools is consistent with secondary schools having more flexibility in 
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awarding PRP for teachers, as primary and secondary schools have a similar 
proportion of classroom teachers affected by the STRB recommendations (at the top 
and bottom of a pay range).  
Teachers in academy schools have slightly higher average pay than teachers in non-
academy schools across the period. The difference is largely unchanged between 
2010 and 2015, despite the increasing number of academy schools (particularly 
academy converters) over the period.  
Across schools in different pay regions, the growth between 2010 and 2015 is almost 
unchanged, although again since the STRB recommendations (and teacher pay 
reform) in 2013 there has been small annual growth. Teacher pay in Inner London 
remains higher, on average, than Outer London, which in turn is higher than Fringe 
London, then the rest of England. This is expected given the structure of pay across 
pay regions.  
3.1.2.3. Teachers’ pay across teacher types 
Considering the differences across teacher types, male teachers have higher pay 
than female teachers, on average. This could reflect a number of factors such as 
average tenure (including career breaks) or the relative presence in primary and 
secondary schools, and across subjects. For example, male teachers in primary 
schools in 2015 had lower base pay, on average, than female teachers in primary 
schools in 2015. A full exploration of the gender pay gap for teachers is beyond the 
scope of this report, however. There is little change in the growth in average pay 
across years for both male and female teachers. 
Black teachers have higher pay than Asian teachers, on average, who in turn have 
(slightly) higher pay than White British teachers, on average. This is likely to reflect 
the different composition of teachers across teacher pay regions, as there is a higher 
proportion of Black teachers in London pay regions (shown in Appendix 2). For 
example, the average difference in pay for teachers across these ethnic groups in 
Inner London in 2015 was around £1,000, as compared to around £2,000 across 
England as a whole. As for male and female teachers, there is very little difference in 
the growth of average teacher pay across ethnic groups, particularly since 2013. 
This is suggestive that the reforms have not been discriminatory across these ethnic 
groups (although further information on the effect at individual level is presented in 
Table 8 and Table 9. 
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Table 2 Level of teachers’ pay (full-time equivalent base pay) in England across years (mean, 
£1,000s) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
All 32.6 32.6 32.5 32.7 32.7 33.0 
Primary 32.2 32.2 32.0 32.1 32.0 32.2 
Secondary 33.0 32.9 32.9 33.2 33.4 33.8 
Academy 32.8 32.7 32.6 32.7 32.7 33.0 
Non-academy 32.6 32.5 32.5 32.6 32.7 32.9 
Inner London 36.9 36.7 36.5 36.3 36.5 36.8 
Outer London 34.6 34.5 34.4 34.4 34.5 34.7 
Fringe London 32.2 32.2 32.2 32.3 32.3 32.7 
Rest of England 32.1 32.0 31.9 32.1 32.1 32.4 
Main pay range 27.9 27.9 27.8 27.9 28.3 28.5 
Upper pay range 37.0 36.8 36.8 37.2 37.3 37.8 
At top of pay range 36.3 36.1 36.0 36.5 37.2 38.4 
Below top of pay range 30.3 30.5 30.3 30.8 31.7 31.9 
Male 33.0 32.8 32.7 32.8 32.8 33.1 
Female 32.5 32.5 32.4 32.6 32.7 32.9 
White 32.6 32.6 32.5 32.7 32.7 33.0 
Black 34.5 34.8 34.7 34.9 34.9 35.0 
Asian 32.2 32.4 32.4 32.7 32.6 32.9 
Maths 33.0 32.9 32.7 32.9 33.0 33.3 
English 32.6 32.7 32.6 32.9 32.9 33.2 
Physics 34.7 34.5 34.2 34.2 34.5 34.9 
Science 32.8 32.8 32.8 33.0 33.1 33.6 
PE 32.5 32.8 33.1 33.5 33.7 34.2 
MFL 33.7 33.7 33.5 33.6 33.7 34.1 
Note: Figures based on final analysis sample described in Appendix 2, for teachers only. The dashed 
line shows the first year of the reform. The dotted line shows the first year pay would be affected by 
the reform. The sample of academy schools changes over years as more schools converted to 
academy status. Subject refers to secondary school teachers only. Not all ethnic groups or secondary 
subjects have been included in the table. 
Source: Longitudinal SWC. 
Table 2 shows that there are differences in average pay across teachers of different 
subjects. For example, in 2010, average pay for Physical Education (PE) teachers 
was £32,500, compared to £34,700 for physics teachers. Differences in average pay 
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across teachers of different secondary school subjects would be expected if there 
are different rates of retention and promotion of staff across subjects, leading to 
changes in the average pay range (and position within pay range). It is hypothesised 
that the pay reforms would affect these differences if teachers receive systematically 
different pay awards across subjects, either due to differences in objective measures 
of performance or school leaders conflating pay for performance and pay for 
recruitment and retention. Increasing pay for retention would be especially likely in 
shortage subjects, such as physics and maths, although specific recruitment and 
retention allowances could be used instead. In 2015, the range in average pay 
across subjects is slightly larger than in 2010, suggesting that the reforms could 
have increased variation in pay awards across subjects, although the composition of 
teachers across subjects is also likely to have changed. The largest increase 
between 2013 and 2015 is for physics and PE teachers: one shortage and one non-
shortage subject. This suggests that increases in pay across years are not driven by 
attempts to retain teachers.  
3.1.3. Average leaders’ pay across school type and individual 
characteristics 
3.1.3.1. Leaders’ pay 
Table 3 presents the equivalent figures for leaders. In contrast to teachers, there is a 
noticeable increase in average pay between 2010 and 2015, of around £1,200 on 
average. This increase largely starts in 2013, consistent with the end of the public 
sector pay freeze. Some of the increase for leaders between 2010 and 2015 is due 
to increasing numbers of executive head teachers and/or school amalgamations, as 
these leaders tend to be paid more and are an increasing proportion of the 
leadership pool over time. 
3.1.3.2. Leaders’ pay across school types 
Considering differences across school types, the pay of leaders in secondary 
schools is higher than the pay of leaders in primary schools, which perhaps reflects 
greater managerial responsibilities in larger schools. Note the STPCD states that 
head teachers pay is directly dependent on the size of school (DfE, 2013a). Base 
pay for leaders has increased across the period in primary and secondary schools. 
The absolute growth (changes in percentage point terms) and relative growth 
(changes in percentage terms) over time are slightly lower in secondary schools.9 
                                            
9 To illustrate the difference between percentage point change and percentage change, there is a 10 
percentage point increase between 10% and 20%. The percentage increase between 10% and 20% 
is 100%.  
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Table 3 Level of leaders' pay (full-time equivalent base pay) in England across years (mean, 
£1,000s) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
All 54.6 54.7 54.8 55.2 55.4 55.8 
Primary 51.4 51.4 51.4 51.8 52.2 52.8 
Secondary 60.6 61.0 60.9 61.4 61.3 61.7 
Academy 61.2 60.6 59.7 59.2 58.5 58.3 
Non-academy 54.4 53.9 53.4 53.7 54.0 54.5 
Inner London 64.2 63.8 63.7 63.4 63.9 63.9 
Outer London 60.9 60.8 60.1 60.7 60.6 60.9 
Fringe London 55.4 55.7 55.7 55.8 56.1 56.6 
Rest of England 53.1 53.3 53.4 53.8 54.0 54.4 
Male 58.1 58.3 58.5 58.9 59.2 59.6 
Female 52.8 52.9 52.9 53.3 53.6 54.1 
White 54.4 54.5 54.5 54.9 55.2 55.6 
Black 59.9 59.1 59.1 59.5 59.7 60.5 
Asian 55.4 55.6 55.5 55.9 56.5 57.0 
Note: Figures based on final analysis sample described in Appendix 2, for leaders only. The dashed 
line shows the first year of the reform. The dotted line shows the first year pay would be affected by 
the reform. The sample of academy schools changes over years are more schools convert to 
academy status. Not all ethnic groups have been included in the table. 
Source: Longitudinal SWC. 
Average pay for leaders in academy schools has declined between 2010 and 2015, 
from an average of around £61,200 to around £58,300. This decline is also present 
from 2013, after the pay reforms and STRB recommendations, suggesting that either 
academy schools have reduced pay for their leaders in response to the reform, or 
changed the composition of leaders to be more junior. This is consistent with 
increasing numbers of academy schools and particularly more primary academy 
schools, which have lower pay, on average. 
Across pay regions, the largest growth between 2010 and 2015 for leaders has been 
in Fringe London and the Rest of England, which is also true comparing the change 
between the pre- and post-reforms periods (2012 to 2015). This may reflect attempts 
to retain staff in regions outside the highest teacher pay regions, but could also 
reflect differences in the proportion of academies across pay regions, or changes in 
the ratio of teachers of shorter and longer tenure. 
34 
 
3.1.3.3. Leaders’ pay across leader types 
Considering the pay for leaders with particular characteristics, male leaders have 
higher average pay than female leaders by around £5,500, across the period. This 
may be driven by the unequal split of male and female teachers in primary and 
secondary schools, as Table 3 also shows that secondary school leaders, on 
average, are paid more than primary school leaders. For example, the average base 
pay for male head teachers in primary schools in 2015 is higher than female head 
teachers in primary schools by around £1,800, compared to an average difference of 
around £7,000 across primary and secondary schools. The disparity between male 
and female leaders could be due to differences in the years of experience, however 
this is not explored here because it is not possible to corroborate in the longitudinal 
SWC, and a full exploration of the gender pay gap for leaders is beyond the scope of 
this report.   
Similarly, the higher levels of pay for Black and Asian leaders compared to White 
British leaders, on average, could be due to the prevalence of these teachers in 
London (where average pay is higher). 
3.1.3. Additional pay across school type and individual 
characteristics 
Small nominal increases in base pay (on average) have been offset to some extent 
by lower receipt of additional pay for teachers. 
Table 4 shows that 38% of teachers received some additional payment in 2013, 
compared to 36% in 2015. The mean level of additional payment (for teachers that 
receive one) is roughly similar between 2013 and 2015 (around £3,500 per annum), 
but lower than in 2010 and 2011. This perhaps suggests that schools have 
responded to the reforms by shifting remuneration from additional pay to base pay, 
but this could be driven by the greater flexibility in base pay or the need to meet the 
requirement for a 1% uplift in pay for some/all classroom teachers within their 
existing budget. 
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Table 4 The percentages of teachers in England in receipt of additional payments and average 
full-time equivalent value (in £1,000s) of these additional payments across years (in brackets) 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
All 37.1 
(4.5) 
37.3 
(4.6) 
36.9 
(3.8) 
37.7 
(3.6) 
35.8 
(3.6) 
36.0 
(3.5) 
Primary 23.5 
(3.0) 
24.0 
(3.0) 
23.6 
(2.5) 
24.3 
(2.3) 
22.8 
(2.4) 
23.3 
(2.4) 
Secondary 50.0 
(5.2) 
50.1 
(5.3) 
49.9 
(4.4) 
51.2 
(4.2) 
49.4 
(4.2) 
49.9 
(4.1) 
Academy 41.8 
(5.0) 
46.4 
(5.1) 
45.6 
(4.0) 
45.5 
(3.9) 
43.5 
(3.9) 
43.3 
(3.8) 
Non-academy 36.9 
(4.5) 
35.2 
(4.4) 
33.5 
(3.7) 
33.7 
(3.4) 
31.2 
(3.3) 
31.2 
(3.2) 
Inner London 44.6 
(4.5) 
44.6 
(4.7) 
43.6 
(3.9) 
43.6 
(3.6) 
42.9 
(3.7) 
43.8 
(3.5) 
Outer London 43.8 
(4.3) 
43.3 
(4.5) 
43.6 
(3.6) 
43.7 
(3.5) 
42.4 
(3.4) 
43.4 
(3.3) 
Fringe London 39.3 
(4.7) 
37.8 
(4.9) 
38.1 
(3.7) 
38.0 
(3.5) 
38.1 
(3.4) 
37.4 
(3.3) 
Rest of England 35.5 
(4.5) 
36.0 
(4.5) 
35.5 
(3.8) 
36.5 
(3.6) 
34.2 
(3.6) 
34.3 
(3.5) 
Main pay range 22.1 
(3.5) 
22.4 
(3.4) 
21.8 
(2.6) 
22.9 
(2.4) 
22.9 
(2.4) 
23.1 
(2.3) 
Upper pay range 51.9 
(4.9) 
51.1 
(5.0) 
51.0 
(4.3) 
52.2 
(4.1) 
49.6 
(4.1) 
50.3 
(4.0) 
At top of pay range 49.5 
(5.0) 
48.5 
(5.1) 
48.1 
(4.4) 
50.1 
(4.2) 
47.3 
(4.2) 
51.5 
(4.2) 
Below top of pay 
range 
29.7 
(4.0) 
30.7 
(4.0) 
30.3 
(3.2) 
31.7 
(3.0) 
34.1 
(3.3) 
33.9 
(3.1) 
Male 48.0 
(5.2) 
47.7 
(5.3) 
47.1 
(4.5) 
47.8 
(4.2) 
45.5 
(4.1) 
45.4 
(4.0) 
Female 33.8 
(4.2) 
34.1 
(4.3) 
33.8 
(3.5) 
34.7 
(3.4) 
32.9 
(3.4) 
33.2 
(3.3) 
White 37.2 
(4.5) 
37.4 
(4.6) 
37.1 
(3.8) 
37.8 
(3.6) 
35.7 
(3.6) 
36.0 
(3.5) 
Black 39.6 
(4.5) 
40.8 
(4.7) 
41.7 
(3.9) 
42.6 
(3.6) 
41.3 
(3.7) 
40.8 
(3.6) 
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  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Asian 35.5 
(4.1) 
36.7 
(4.3) 
36.2 
(3.6) 
37.9 
(3.3) 
37.3 
(3.2) 
37.4 
(3.1) 
Maths 45.6 
(5.2) 
46.5 
(5.6) 
45.4 
(4.5) 
46.9 
(4.2) 
44.8 
(4.1) 
44.7 
(3.9) 
English 47.5 
(5.1) 
49.0 
(5.4) 
48.7 
(4.3) 
49.3 
(4.0) 
47.3 
(4.0) 
47.2 
(3.9) 
Physics 56.2 
(5.3) 
54.4 
(5.7) 
56.6 
(4.5) 
58.1 
(4.1) 
56.8 
(4.2) 
56.8 
(4.2) 
Science 58.2 
(5.0) 
59.8 
(5.2) 
60.3 
(4.5) 
62.6 
(4.3) 
60.5 
(4.3) 
62.1 
(4.3) 
PE 46.5 
(5.0) 
47.6 
(5.3) 
47.2 
(4.4) 
48.5 
(4.0) 
46.6 
(4.0) 
47.2 
(3.9) 
MFL 47.9 
(5.0) 
48.5 
(5.4) 
47.7 
(4.4) 
48.4 
(4.2) 
46.7 
(4.2) 
47.9 
(4.0) 
Note: Figures based on final analysis sample described in Appendix 2, for teachers only. The dashed 
line shows the first year of the reform. The dotted line shows the first year pay would be affected by 
the reform. The sample of academy schools changes over years are more schools convert to 
academy status. Subject refers to secondary school teachers only. Not all ethnic groups or secondary 
subjects have been included in the table. 
Source: Longitudinal SWC. 
3.1.4. Summary 
This section has shown that on average, the pay of teachers increased very slightly 
between 2010 and 2015, and when comparing pre- and post- reforms periods. The 
pay for teachers, on average, stayed almost identical, which equates to a real terms 
drop in base pay of around 2%. Average pay for leaders rose slightly, by around 
£1,200, which equates to a real terms decrease of around 1%. This means that 
teachers experienced a greater reduction in pay than leaders in real terms between 
2010 and 2015. There is variation across school and teacher types, with noticeable 
differences in the level of base pay over the period between academy and non-
academy schools, male and female teachers, and teachers of White British, Black 
and Asian ethnicity. As noted previously, these differences may be due to other 
factors, such as prevalence in particular regions with different teacher pay ranges, or 
other features of the teacher labour market, but provide a first indication that the 
reforms may have affected teachers’ and leaders’ pay in England.  
Small nominal increases in base pay across the period have been partly offset by a 
decline in the prevalence of additional payments for teachers, although the average 
value for those that receive an additional payment remained similar between the 
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immediate pre-reforms year and post-reforms years. The decrease in prevalence of 
additional payments implies that teachers that no longer receive an additional 
payment will have a larger decrease in total pay than the decrease for base pay 
reported above. 
3.2. Variation of teachers’ base pay in England by teacher’s 
age across years 
This section considers the variation in teachers’ and leaders’ base pay in England. 
Variation is defined by the sample standard deviation,10  although the figures below 
also present an alternative measure, which focuses on the ratio of pay near the top 
and bottom of the pay distribution. The variation in pay is a useful summary indicator 
for whether the reforms have meaningfully affected teachers’ and leaders’ pay in 
state funded schools in England. This is because changes in the variation in teacher 
pay suggest that schools are using flexibility in teacher pay awards, with the caveat 
that changes in the composition of the workforce, such as proportionally more newly 
qualified teachers (NQTs), would also affect the variation. First, a general picture of 
the variation in pay is presented, shown according to teachers’ and leaders’ ages 
and across years spanning the pay reform. This informs whether there have been 
general trends in the variation of pay across the age distribution, which is used as a 
proxy for the distribution of teaching experience. Second, a more detailed description 
of the average variation in pay across school types, teacher and leader types, and 
years is presented. This informs whether there have been particularly noticeable 
increases in particular circumstances. In both cases, however, it is not possible to 
distinguish the effect of the PRP reforms to the effect of recommendations from the 
STRB on the variation of teachers’ pay. 
3.2.1. Variation in teacher and leader pay across teaching 
tenure/age 
Figure 3 shows the variation in base pay for teachers for a time period before the 
reforms (November 2012) and a time period after the reforms (November 2015). The 
first panel uses the standard deviation. A higher standard deviation implies more 
variation in teacher pay. The distribution is shown according to teachers’ age, which 
is used as a proxy for years of teaching as this information is not consistently 
reported in the SWC. The second panel of Figure 3 shows an alternative measure of 
the variation in teachers’ pay, which is the ratio between pay at the 90th percentile 
(high in the distribution) and 10th percentile (low in the distribution). This “90-10” 
measure has the benefit of being robust to outlying observations (not affected by 
                                            
10 The standard deviation is a measure of the variance across observations in a sample (in this case 
teachers and leaders in the SWC). More values, which are further from the mean (or average), imply 
higher variation, and therefore a higher standard deviation.   
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particularly low and high values which may be spurious), but the disadvantage that 
changes in variation in the middle of the distribution are not included. A higher “90-
10” measure implies a larger difference between pay at the 10th percentile and pay at 
the 90th percentile, so more variation between these points. Both measures of 
variation in Figure 3 show a slight increase in variation in teachers’ base pay across 
ages over time, across all ages, which suggest that teachers’ pay awards have 
diversified in response to the reform.  
Figure 3: Standard deviation and 90-10 ratio in teachers' pay (full-time equivalent base pay) in 
England in 2012 and 2015 
 
 
Note: Figures based on final analysis sample described in Appendix 2, for teachers only. 
Source: Longitudinal SWC.  
Figure 4 shows the equivalent picture for the variation in leaders’ pay. There is a 
slight increase in the variation in leaders’ base pay across the period and across 
ages, but this is mostly evident for older leaders, who would typically have more 
experience. Note that the variation in leaders’ pay increases as leaders’ age, in 
contrast to the variation in teachers’ pay which is non-linear (increasing until around 
30, before flattening, and then increasing around age 50). For leaders as for 
teachers, the 90-10 ratio and standard deviation measures of variation are 
consistent, both showing a small increase for leaders of most ages.  
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Figure 4: Standard deviation and 90-10 ratio in leaders' pay (full-time equivalent base pay) in 
England in 2012 and 2015 
 
Note: Figures based on final analysis sample described in Appendix 2, for leaders only, additionally 
excluding leaders with age 27 or below as there were less than 500 observations which is too low for 
meaningful comparisons over time. 
Source: Longitudinal SWC.  
3.2.2. Variation in teacher and leader pay across school type and 
individual characteristics 
Table 5 shows the variation in teachers’ base pay across all available years of the 
SWC, for all teachers, and then for teachers in particular school types and particular 
characteristics. For all teachers as a whole, there is evidence of a small increase in 
the variation of teachers’ base pay across years. This small increase in variance is 
evident across school and teacher types. Some caution in this interpretation is 
required, however, as the STRB reforms could affect the variation of teachers’ pay if 
a large proportion of teachers are awarded a 1% increase in the post-reforms period. 
This is explored further in later sections. 
The increase in variation over time is slightly larger for teachers on the main pay 
range than the upper pay range. This suggests that increasing flexibility is being 
used for teachers on the main pay range.  
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Table 5 Variation of teachers' pay (full-time equivalent base pay) in England across years 
(standard deviation) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
All 6.2 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.5 6.6 
Primary 5.7 5.7 5.8 5.9 6.2 6.3 
Secondary 6.6 6.3 6.3 6.5 6.7 6.8 
Academy 7.6 6.6 6.4 6.6 6.7 6.7 
Non-academy 6.1 5.9 5.9 6.0 6.3 6.4 
Inner London 7.5 7.3 7.4 7.7 8.0 8.0 
Outer London 6.2 6.1 6.3 6.4 6.6 6.6 
Fringe London 6.0 5.8 5.9 6.0 6.1 6.4 
Rest of England 5.8 5.7 5.7 5.9 6.1 6.2 
Main pay range 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.3 4.9 4.8 
Upper pay range 3.1 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.3 3.3 
At top of pay range 4.0 3.7 3.7 3.9 4.2 3.9 
Below top of pay range 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.6 
Male 6.6 6.5 6.5 6.6 6.8 6.9 
Female 6.0 5.9 5.9 6.1 6.4 6.4 
White 6.1 5.9 5.9 6.1 6.3 6.4 
Black 7.0 6.8 6.9 7.1 7.3 7.5 
Asian 6.7 6.5 6.5 6.7 7.0 7.1 
Maths 6.6 6.5 6.6 6.8 7.0 7.1 
English 6.5 6.3 6.4 6.7 6.9 7.1 
Physics 5.6 5.9 5.6 6.0 6.0 6.0 
Science 6.3 6.1 6.2 6.4 6.6 6.6 
PE 6.1 5.8 5.7 5.9 6.1 6.2 
MFL 5.9 5.9 6.0 6.2 6.4 6.5 
Note: Figures based on final analysis sample described in Appendix 2, for teachers only. The dashed 
line shows the first year of the reform. The dotted line shows the first year pay would be affected by 
the reform. The sample of academy schools changes over years are more schools convert to 
academy status. Subject refers to secondary school teachers only. Not all ethnic groups or secondary 
subjects have been included in the table. 
Source: Longitudinal SWC. 
Table 6 presents the equivalent figures for leaders. There is a noticeable increase in 
the variation of base pay between 2010 and 2015, which is larger than is evident for 
teachers. This is consistent with the aim of the reforms to increase variation by 
performance, although the increase is evident across the period, which suggests it is 
41 
 
not entirely due to the reform. This is true across most categories of school and 
leader characteristics. One exception is academy schools, where the variation 
decreased between 2010 and 2015. There is also less change in variation over time 
for non-academy schools, but there is an increase in variation between 2013 and 
2015 (pre- and post- reform). 
Considering differences across school and leader characteristics, there is a larger 
increase in variation for male than female leaders, which may reflect their higher 
initial level of base pay. There is also a larger increase in variation for Black and 
White British leaders in comparison with Asian leaders. The variation in base pay 
increases across all regions where teacher pay ranges vary, but less so outside the 
London area. 
Table 6 Variation of leaders' pay (full-time equivalent base pay) in England across years 
(standard deviation) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
All 12.1 12.4 12.7 12.8 13.0 13.1 
Primary 9.5 9.8 10.0 10.1 10.4 10.6 
Secondary 13.9 14.3 14.6 14.9 15.2 15.2 
Academy 16.1 15.3 15.4 15.2 15.3 15.1 
Non-academy 11.9 11.7 11.5 11.5 11.6 11.7 
Inner London 13.5 14.0 14.2 14.5 15.0 15.1 
Outer London 13.4 14.0 15.1 14.2 14.3 14.0 
Fringe London 12.1 12.5 12.9 13.0 13.4 13.7 
Rest of England 11.2 11.6 11.7 12.0 12.2 12.2 
Male 13.3 13.7 14.0 14.3 14.7 14.7 
Female 11.0 11.3 11.5 11.6 11.8 11.8 
White 11.9 12.3 12.5 12.7 12.9 13.0 
Black 12.9 13.6 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.8 
Asian 12.9 13.2 12.7 12.5 12.8 12.6 
Note: Figures based on final analysis sample described in Appendix 2, for leaders only. The dashed 
line shows the first year of the reform. The dotted line shows the first year pay would be affected by 
the reform. The sample of academy schools changes over years are more schools convert to 
academy status. Not all ethnic groups have been included in the table. 
Source: Longitudinal SWC. 
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3.2.3. Within- and between-school variation in pay 
 
Table 7 breaks down the overall variation in teachers’ base pay into that due to 
variation within schools, and variation across schools. Within-school variation is the 
average variation in base pay between teachers measured within schools. The 
reforms would increase within-school variation if schools differentiate the pay of their 
teachers according to performance. Between-school variation is the average 
variation in base pay between teachers measured across schools. The reforms 
would increase between-school variation if schools adopt different policies, and have 
different financial capacity to increase the pay of some teachers. 
The between-school variation is larger than the within-school variation across years, 
and most school and teacher types. This means that there is more variation across 
schools than within schools, which might be partly driven by the teacher pay regions. 
Exceptions where the within-school variation is larger than the between-school 
variation are for Black and Asian teachers, which is most likely driven by low 
numbers of these teachers in some schools, as this would inflate the within-school 
variation in pay. Another exception where the within-school variation is higher than 
the between-school variation is physics teachers. The within-school variation is also 
highest for teachers of this subject. These factors might reflect larger differences in 
the seniority of teachers within schools for this shortage subject.   
Considering now changes in the within-school variation over time, there is little 
evidence of large systematic changes up to 2015, although the within-school 
variation typically rises over time for most groups. This suggests that pay is 
increasingly differentiated over time. There is also little evidence of large changes in 
the between-school variation over time for all teachers, although again the trend is 
generally an increase in variation over time. This is consistent with schools 
implementing different PRP policies, and differences in the scope to differentiate 
pay.  
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Table 7 Within and between school variation in teachers' pay (full-time equivalent base pay) across years 
 Within-school variation Between-school variation 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
All 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.8 2.8 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.7 6.0 6.0 
Primary 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.8 2.8 5.1 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.6 5.7 
Secondary 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.4 6.2 6.0 6.0 6.1 6.3 6.4 
Academy 3.0 2.3 2.4 2.8 2.8 2.8 7.2 6.2 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 
Non-academy 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.8 2.8 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.8 5.8 
Inner London 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.2 3.1 7.1 6.9 7.0 7.2 7.5 7.4 
Outer London 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 5.9 5.8 6.0 6.0 6.2 6.3 
Fringe London 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.3 5.7 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 6.0 
Rest of England 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.6 5.5 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.7 5.8 
Main pay range 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.8 2.8 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.7 4.1 4.1 
Upper pay range 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.5 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.3 
At top of pay range 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.9 3.8 3.5 3.1 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.1 2.7 
Below top of pay range 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.0 4.9 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.9 
Male 4.8 4.9 4.9 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.8 5.7 5.6 5.7 5.9 5.9 
Female 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.9 2.9 5.5 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.8 5.9 
White 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0 5.6 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.8 5.8 
Black 5.7 5.5 5.5 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.1 5.0 5.1 5.3 5.5 5.6 
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 Within-school variation Between-school variation 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Asian 5.3 5.3 5.2 5.4 5.7 5.7 5.1 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.4 5.5 
Maths 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.5 5.9 5.7 5.9 6.0 6.2 6.4 
English 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.4 5.8 5.6 5.7 5.9 6.2 6.3 
Physics 4.5 4.8 4.7 5.0 4.9 5.3 4.0 4.1 3.7 3.9 4.1 3.8 
Science 3.0 2.9 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.2 5.7 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.9 6.0 
PE 3.2 3.1 3.0 3.3 3.4 3.6 5.4 5.1 5.0 5.0 5.3 5.3 
MFL 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.8 4.1 4.0 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.3 5.4 5.5 
Note: Figures based on final analysis sample described in Appendix 2, for teachers only. The dashed line shows the first year of the reform. The dotted line 
shows the first year pay would be affected by the reform. The sample of academy schools changes over years are more schools convert to academy status. 
Subject refers to secondary school teachers only. Not all ethnic groups or secondary subjects have been included in the table. 
Source: Longitudinal SWC. 
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3.2.4. Summary 
This section has shown that there have been some changes in the variation of 
teachers’ and leaders’ pay across time, but these are minimal (in the case of 
teachers) and not clearly related to the timing of the reforms (for leaders). In addition, 
there are no large systematic changes in the within- and between-school variances, 
which would indicate changes in schools’ individual pay decisions within-school or 
differences in pay policies adopted across schools. However, the data currently 
available are informative for only two years’ of pay awards after the reforms for 
teachers and one year after the reforms for leaders. These findings are also limited 
by the impact of changes in the composition of teachers and leaders across the 
workforce. For example, moving to a less experienced teacher workforce changes 
both the observed level and variation of pay. The following section therefore 
considers whether there have been changes in the level and variation of individual 
teachers’ annual change in nominal pay as a result of the reform. 
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4. Level and variation of teachers’ annual change in 
nominal pay in England 
This section considers the size and variation in the year-to-year change in gross 
annual base pay of teachers and leaders in England from 2010-to-2011 to 2014-to-
2015. “2010-to-2011” refers to the year-to-year change in gross annual base pay 
between the academic year 2010/2011 (measured in the SWC November 2010 
census) and the academic year 2011/2012 (measured in the SWC November 2011). 
Prior to the reforms, pay was a function of spine points and the STRB pay 
recommendations. Post the reforms, there were no official spine points and pay 
awards should depend on performance. Therefore, one would expect more diversion 
in annual changes in wages after the reform. It is important to note that the first two 
years in the tables (2010-to-2011 and 2011-to-2012) were affected by the public 
sector pay freeze, which changes the interpretation of schools’ pay awards 
significantly. The first year where year-to-year changes in gross annual base pay 
would be affected by the reforms is “2013-to-2014”, as the first pay determination 
under the new PRP would be observed in the November 2014 SWC. 
4.1. Teachers’ change in nominal pay 
4.1.1. Main pay range 
Table 8 presents the proportion of teachers on the main pay range receiving growth 
in base pay by percentile band across each academic year from 2010-to-2011 to 
2014-to-2015. Each column will sum to 100%, although note that the percent in each 
band has been rounded to one decimal place. The first two columns show that 
around 20% of teachers on the main pay range had no growth in base pay, all else 
being equal. This is in contrast to 2014-to-2015, when only 10% of teachers on the 
main pay range have no annual growth in base pay. Again it should be noted that the 
SWC may not record all relevant school pay decisions. This is because under the 
most pessimistic assumption around 32% of classroom teachers in post for at least 
one year had not yet received their pay award decision by the census date in 2015.  
Despite the pay freeze, not all teachers experience zero growth in wages, as 
teachers who moved up a spine point would still receive a pay increase. This is 
reflected in the high proportion of teachers experiencing specific jumps in pay. These 
can be seen at 7-8% growth, accounting for about 50% of teachers on the main pay 
range and 16-17% growth, representing 5% of teachers on the main pay range. 
These specific jumps in pay are highlighted in Table 8 in light blue, with the most 
common being growth of around 7-8%, consistent with the typical growth between 
reference spine points over the pay regions.  
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The same pattern in the spikes in the growth of teacher pay can also be seen in 
2012-to-2013, but at a 1 percentage point higher growth in accordance with the 
STRB recommendation of a 1% pay increase. For example in 2011-to-2012, 50% of 
teachers on the main pay range experienced a pay rise of 7-8%, and in 2012-to-
2013, 47% of teachers on the main pay range experienced an 8-9% increase. In this 
year, there was an increase in the percentage of teachers with a 1-2% pay increase, 
which coincides with the change in STRB recommendations for annual increases in 
nominal pay.  
In all the subsequent years, the same pattern in the growth of teacher pay growth 
remains, but to a lesser extent. For example, the proportion experiencing the 8-9% 
increase reduces from 47% in 2011-to-2012, to 22% in 2014-to-2015. There is also 
more spread around this reference level of growth, with 25% of teachers in the 
adjacent four categories, compared to 18% in 2011-to-2012. This is indicative 
evidence that in November 2015, schools’ annual pay awards were in line with these 
(now reference) spine points, supporting the statement by the NAHT to the STRB 
that its members have ‘largely chosen to continue to use the existing pay scales and 
points that existed in STPCD 2013’ (NAHT 2015). However, the increase in variation 
around these reference spine points suggests that at least some schools have 
moved away from these reference points. 
The proportion of teachers receiving 1-2% growth declines slightly from 2012-to-
2013 to 2014-to-2015, from 16% to 14%. This is in line with changes in the STRB 
recommendations that the 1% inflation increase was applicable only those at the 
minimum and maximum of the pay range from 2014 onwards.  
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Table 8 Teachers' annual change in nominal pay (full-time equivalent base pay) in England 
between years, for teachers on the main pay range below the top of the pay range  
 2010-2011 2011- 2012 2012- 2013 2013- 2014 2014- 2015 
Less than 0% 1.0 0.5 3.3 5.3 1.7 
0% 19.3 20.4 0.4 11.0 10.8 
0-1% 0.2 0.2 1.6 4.8 2.4 
1-2% 0.1 0.0 15.8 22.0 14.4 
2-3% 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.9 4.0 
3-4% 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 1.8 
4-5% 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.9 0.8 
5-6% 3.2 3.2 0.8 0.7 0.8 
6-7% 3.4 3.4 3.6 3.5 2.8 
7-8% 50.1 50.3 4.0 6.9 7.3 
8-9% 11.4 11.6 47.2 24.3 21.8 
9-10% 0.1 0.1 10.6 6.1 8.7 
10-11% 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.6 5.9 
11-12% 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.5 1.5 
12-13% 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.6 
13-14% 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.6 0.7 
14-15% 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 
15-16% 1.0 0.9 0.1 0.6 0.5 
16-17% 5.7 5.4 1.1 1.6 2.2 
17-18% 0.0 0.0 4.6 3.0 3.6 
18-19% 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.7 2.3 
19-20% 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.8 
More than 20% 3.2 2.8 4.1 4.9 4.2 
Note: Figures based on final analysis sample described in Appendix 2, for teachers below the top of 
(but on) the main pay range only, with “all else equal” across adjacent years. The dashed line shows 
the first year of the reform. The dotted line shows the first year annual change in nominal pay would 
be affected by the reform. 
Source: Longitudinal SWC. 
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4.1.2. Upper pay range 
Table 9 presents the equivalent figures for teachers on the upper pay range. Here, 
the relevant reference level of growth in nominal pay is around 3-4%. As for teachers 
on the main pay range, there is a reduction in the proportion of teachers receiving a 
pay award in line with this reference growth and increasing variation around this 
point. Teachers on the upper pay range appear to have been particularly affected by 
the change in STRB recommendations, with 60% of teachers on this pay range 
receiving an annual increase in base pay of between 1-2% in the year following the 
change.  
Overall, Table 8 and Table 9 suggest that the pay reforms have affected the annual 
change in nominal base pay for teachers, all else being equal. When base pay is 
increased, the increase is still largely in line with the pre-defined reference level 
(spine point), but there is evidence that at least some schools are diverging from 
these reference levels and differentiating pay awards.  
Table 9 Teachers' annual change in nominal pay (full-time equivalent base pay) in England 
between years, for teachers on the upper pay range below the top of the pay range 
 2010-2011 2011- 2012 2012- 2013 2013- 2014 2014- 2015 
Less than 0% 3.7 2.0 5.6 6.8 2.6 
0% 65.9 70.5 0.4 14.4 15.9 
0-1% 1.1 1.1 6.5 12.0 5.1 
1-2% 0.1 0.1 60.3 38.3 39.9 
2-3% 0.2 0.1 0.3 3.1 14.4 
3-4% 27.1 24.1 0.6 4.0 5.2 
4-5% 0.9 0.9 22.4 17.6 12.2 
5-6% 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.1 2.5 
6-7% 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.6 
7-8% 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 
8-9% 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.7 0.4 
9-10% 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
10-15% 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 
15-20% 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 
More than 20% 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.8 0.5 
Note: Figures based on final analysis sample described in Appendix 2, for teachers below the top of 
(but on) the upper pay range only, with “all else equal” across adjacent years. The dashed line shows 
the first year of the reform. The dotted line shows the first year annual change in nominal pay would 
be affected by the reform. 
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4.2. Teachers’ change in nominal base pay (where 
increasing) 
Expanding on these findings, Table 10 presents summary statistics for the size of the 
increases in base pay over the five year period for those that experienced some 
growth. The top row of Table 10 reports the proportion of teachers receiving a 
nominal pay increase, which are first reported in Table 8 and Table 9. The remaining 
rows report summary statistics for those who have experienced at least some 
growth.  For example, the mean increase in nominal pay between 2010 and 2011 for 
those (56.8% of the full sample) that received at least a positive increase in nominal 
base pay was 8.1%. For these individuals, the mean increase in growth during the 
pay restraint (and pre-reform) years (2010-to-2011, 2011-to-2012) was around 8%. 
This is similar to the median level of growth for both periods. The 5th percentile is 
2.5%, suggesting that teachers either received zero or a relatively large annual 
increases in base pay in the pre-reform, public pay restraint, period. 
Table 10 Teachers' annual change in nominal pay (below the top of the pay range) in England 
between years: % with some increase in nominal pay and summary statistics for those with 
increase in nominal pay  
 2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-2013 2013-2014 2014- 2015 
% increase in 
nominal pay 
56.8 54.5 95.2 81.4 84.7 
For those with some increase in nominal pay: 
Mean (%) 8.1 8.0 6.0 5.8 6.0 
Standard deviation 
(%) 
6.4 5.9 7.3 8.0 7.5 
5th percentile (%) 3.7 3.7 1.0 1.0 1.0 
25th percentile (%) 5.2 6 1.0 1.0 1.0 
50th percentile (%) 7.9 7.9 4.7 3.7 3.9 
75th percentile (%) 7.9 7.9 9.0 8.8 9.0 
95th percentile (%) 16.6 16.6 17.5 17.6 17.7 
Note: Figures based on final analysis sample described in Appendix 2, for teachers below the top of 
their pay range only, with “all else equal” across adjacent years. The dashed line shows the first year 
of the reform. The dotted line shows the first year annual change in nominal pay would be affected by 
the reform. 
Source: Longitudinal SWC. 
The distribution of annual increases in base pay changes significantly after the 
change in STRB recommendations for 2013. For the 2012-to-2013, period the 
majority of teachers that receive some growth receive an annual increase of 1% - the 
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recommended level by the STRB. This has the effect of decreasing the mean level 
from 2012-to-2013 onwards, as the majority of teachers received this smaller 
increase in base pay (rather than zero and so are included in this sample). This is 
also reflected in the smaller standard deviation in the increase in wages (for those 
with a positive increase in pay), and that the lower median pay growth, which in 
2012-to-2013 and 2013-to-2014 was 1%, compared to 7.9% in previous years.  
4.3. “Expected” increases in nominal base pay 
Table 10 highlights the need for caution when interpreting changes in the mean and 
standard deviation of the growth in base pay across years for the whole sample, 
which is affected significantly by the proportion of teachers with zero growth, and 
those directly affected by STRB recommendations with annual growth of 1%. To 
address this, Table 11 compares the proportion of teachers that receive a level of 
increase in nominal pay that is approximately consistent with growth between the 
spine points previously used before the pay reform, and equivalent reference spine 
points now used by some schools. The “expected” or greater increase in base pay in 
Table 11, therefore, shows the proportion of teachers currently below the top of their 
pay range, that receive an annual increase in pay at least equal to the increase 
between their current reference spine point and next reference spine point.11 This 
definition is used rather than one based on a fixed percentage increase, as the 
growth between different reference spine points and across the pay regions varies.   
The overall proportion is also affected by the proportion of teachers on the upper pay 
range, where progression between reference spine points was more typical every 
two years than annually before the reform. To illustrate these points, in 2011-to-
2012, 69% of those on the main pay range received the “expected” level of growth, 
compared to 25% of those on the upper pay range.  
4.3.1. Changes over time 
The reforms have coincided with a decline in the percentage receiving the expected 
increase in nominal base pay across years, across the sample of teachers as a 
whole, falling from 54% between 2011 and 2012 to 47% between 2014 and 2015. 
This decline is most notable for those on the main pay range - 74% between 2011 
and 2012, compared to 46% between 2013 and 2014, and 58% between 2014 and 
2015. This suggests that some schools have adopted flexible annual pay awards, at 
least in the proportion of schools awarding annual nominal pay increases in line with 
                                            
11 This, and the following tables in this section, use those below the top of the pay range only, as the 
teachers at the top of their pay range would not expect to receive “automatic” progression to the next 
pay range, even before the pay reform. Promotion between the main and upper pay range is 
considered separately in Table 17. 
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the reference spine points. The effect has been to generally decrease the proportion 
of teachers receiving the nominal pay increases associated with the spine points 
previously used. However, this is not universally true. For example, teachers in Inner 
London are more likely to receive a pay award in line with previously expected 
growth in nominal pay according to spine points. This could reflect changes in the 
composition of the teacher workforce in Inner London, for example if there are 
proportionally more teachers on the main pay range in Inner London over time, or 
the type of pay policies adopted in Inner London.  
4.3.2. Changes over time by teacher type 
Comparing differences across teacher types, there is a decline over time for male 
and female teachers. Although the level is consistently lower for female teachers 
over time, the reforms appears to have closed the gap in the proportion achieving at 
least the expected level between male and female teachers. This is also true across 
teachers of different subjects, where although differences remain, they have 
equalised over time. The absolute difference between the maximum and minimum, 
was 10 percentage points in 2010-to-2011, and declines 7 percentage points in 
2014-to-2015. Priority subjects do not have the highest level of teachers receiving at 
least the expected level, which would be expected if schools were more likely to 
award this level of pay increase to increase retention. This may reflect differences in 
the composition of teachers across subjects. 
 
  
53 
 
Table 11 Percentage with expected or greater increase in base pay for teachers below the top 
of the pay range, according to spine point equivalent progression 
 2010- 2011 2011- 2012 2012- 2013 2013- 2014 2014- 2015 
All 53.5 48.6 48.7 38.9 46.9 
Primary 49.5 45.1 45.3 39.1 46.3 
Secondary 58.1 52.5 52.7 38.5 47.8 
Academy 54.8 52.4 52.6 40.5 47.6 
Non-academy 53.4 47.8 47.4 38.2 46.6 
Inner London 48.6 45.7 45.5 42.8 53.6 
Outer London 52.3 49.9 48.4 41.4 45.8 
Fringe London 51.8 47.7 47.5 39.3 51.6 
Rest of England 54.3 48.8 49.2 38.1 46.0 
Main pay range 74.2 68.8 66.7 46.0 57.6 
Upper pay range 28.6 24.7 26.1 28.1 28.2 
Male 56.4 51.3 51.8 39.9 48.8 
Female 52.7 47.8 47.8 38.6 46.4 
White 53.2 48.3 48.4 39.3 47.0 
Black 48.5 42.1 42.6 33.5 40.1 
Asian 58.5 52.2 50.6 38.3 48.5 
Maths 57.0 52.6 54.4 39.4 48.2 
English 58.5 53.0 53.7 38.9 49.5 
Physics 52.5 50.5 50.9 42.2 48.1 
Science 58.8 52.6 52.4 38.5 47.6 
PE 62.7 56.6 56.7 44.1 54.3 
MFL 55.0 50.0 51.4 38.6 48.1 
Note: Figures based on final analysis sample described in Appendix 2, for teachers below the top of 
their pay range only. The dashed line shows the first year of the reform. The dotted line shows the 
first year pay would be affected by the reform. The sample of academy schools changes over years 
are more schools convert to academy status. Subject refers to secondary school teachers only. Not 
all ethnic groups or secondary subjects have been included in the table. 
Source: Longitudinal SWC. 
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Differences across teachers of White British, Black and Asian ethnic groups have 
decreased slightly since the reform. Between 2014 and 2015, Black teachers had the 
lowest level of expected increase in base pay (40%), compared to 47% for White 
British teachers and 49% for Asian teachers. This goes against the general pattern 
for Inner London (where Black teachers are proportionally more likely to teach), 
where there has been an increase in the proportion of teachers achieving the 
expected level of increase in nominal pay. This disparity should therefore be 
explored in more detail, but unfortunately it is outside the scope of this report.  
There is a general pattern across Table 11 that the proportion of teachers with an 
annual increase in nominal pay in line with reference spine points is lower between 
2013 and 2014, than between 2014 and 2015. This could reflect schools moving 
towards more typical pay awards, as their pay reforms become established, or a 
change in the composition of teachers across these years, potentially in response to 
the reform. For example, poorly performing teachers who received a low level of 
increase in nominal pay between 2013 and 2014 may be more likely to have left the 
profession between 2014 and 2015.12 
4.3.3. Variation across local authorities 
The variation in the proportion with “expected” or greater increase in base pay 
across LAs is shown in Figure 5. As already shown in Table 11, there are typically 
higher proportions of teachers receiving the expected increase in base pay in 
London LAs (shown most clearly in the expanded inset). There are generally 
relatively high levels around London, and most of the South West, and generally 
lower levels in the East of England. There are some LAs where the proportion is 
especially low, and future research could usefully explore the school-level policies 
and LA guidance in these areas. 
  
                                            
12 Table 13 explores the proportion of teachers that leave or move schools between each year, 
finding that the proportion has increased over time. This could be due to the pay reforms or a general 
trend in the movement of teachers, however.  
55 
 
Figure 5: Percentage "expected or greater annual change in nominal pay" for those below the 
top of their pay range according to spine point approximation across Local Authorities in 
England (2013 to 2014) 
 
Note: The legend to the graph refers to the percentage of teachers in the LA that receive “expected or 
greater annual change in nominal pay” between 2013 and 2014. For example, (5,10] means that more 
than 5% and less than (or equal to) 10% of teachers receive “expected or greater annual change in 
nominal pay”. 
 Source: Longitudinal SWC. 
4.4. Within- and between-school variation in annual pay 
awards 
A final way to consider the variance in the change of teacher pay is to again consider 
the variance both within and across schools. It is hypothesised that the reforms will 
increase the within-school variation in annual changes in pay as school leaders have 
the freedom to pay teachers more or less (dependant on performance) and at non-
standard (away from reference spine point) amounts. It is also hypothesised that the 
between-school variation will increase if schools adopt different policies to recruit 
and retain staff, and according to their financial circumstances. Table 12 presents 
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summary statistics for the within- and between-school variance in the change of 
teacher base pay to explore these hypotheses. 
In general, there is more variation in the change of pay across schools than within 
schools, which may in part be driven by the presence and structure of teacher pay 
regions, which have different growth between regional reference spine points. 
Within-school variation is also likely to be lower due to school-specific practices in 
the timing of pay decisions. For example, some schools may make all pay decisions 
before the November census date and other schools may make all pay decisions 
afterwards, which would reduce the within-school variation in pay and increase the 
between-school variation in pay. Unlike Table 7, which presented the within- and 
across-school variation in the level of base pay, and showed a minor impact of the 
reform, Table 12 shows the variance in the change of teacher pay appears to have 
been affected more markedly. Across all schools, the within-school variation and 
between-school variation increases across the period.  
4.4.1. Within-school variation in annual pay awards 
Focussing first on the within-school variation in changes in pay, primary schools 
typically have higher within-school variance compared to secondary schools, both 
before and after the reform, which is likely to be driven by the smaller school 
workforce in primary schools. The within-school variance in pay growth is similar for 
academy and non-academy schools for all years, and there is evidence of growth in 
within-school variation in both school groups. Schools across all teacher pay regions 
show a growth in the within-school variation over time. Schools in Inner London have 
the largest level of within-school variation, and growth since the reform.  
Male teachers consistently have higher within-school variance than female teachers, 
and both experience an increase post-reforms. Asian and Black teachers have 
higher within-school variance in pay growth than White British teachers, which may 
be due to smaller sample sizes within schools, which artificially increases the within-
school variance.  
4.4.2. Between-school variation in annual pay awards 
Turning to the between-school variation in pay growth across schools, there is 
typically an increase between the pre-reforms years and 2014-to-2015  
The between-school variance for Inner London increases less than in other pay 
regions. This is in contrast to the change in the within-school variance over time, and 
suggests that schools in Inner London have responded more to the reforms - which 
has affected teachers’ pay awards - but in a largely consistent way across schools. 
In other pay regions, the variation across schools has increased. 
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Table 12 Within- and between- school variation in teachers' annual change in nominal pay for those below the top of their pay range across years 
 Within-school variation Between-school variation 
 2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-2013 2013-2014 2014-2015 2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-2013 2013-2014 2014-2015 
All 4.4 4.0 5.4 5.5 4.9 5.4 5.0 6.5 6.7 6.7 
Primary 4.6 4.1 5.3 5.8 5.0 5.0 4.7 6.0 6.6 5.9 
Secondary 3.4 3.5 5.8 4.0 4.0 5.8 5.4 7.1 6.8 7.4 
Academy 4.9 3.5 6.4 5.7 5.0 7.4 5.7 7.1 6.7 7.7 
Non-academy 4.4 4.0 5.3 5.5 4.9 5.3 4.9 6.3 6.7 6.0 
Inner London 4.1 4.0 5.4 6.5 5.8 5.8 5.3 7.4 10.7 6.5 
Outer London 3.3 3.0 4.0 4.8 4.3 4.5 4.7 6.2 6.4 6.1 
Fringe London 4.3 3.5 4.6 6.0 5.0 4.9 4.5 5.8 6.6 6.5 
Rest of England 4.5 4.1 5.5 5.5 4.9 5.5 5.1 6.5 6.1 6.8 
Main pay range 5.5 5.1 6.3 6.8 6.3 4.9 4.6 6.0 6.8 6.3 
Upper pay range 2.5 2.0 4.2 4.4 3.5 2.3 2.4 4.2 4.2 4.8 
Male 5.4 5.1 6.5 6.0 5.9 5.1 4.7 6.0 5.5 5.6 
Female 4.5 4.1 5.5 5.7 5.1 5.3 5.0 6.5 6.8 6.7 
White 4.5 4.1 5.5 5.7 5.0 5.4 4.9 6.4 6.6 6.7 
Black 6.2 6.1 8.1 7.5 6.6 4.7 4.1 5.5 5.4 4.1 
Asian 5.8 5.2 7.2 7.0 6.5 4.2 4.1 5.5 5.4 4.9 
Maths 4.8 4.9 7.4 5.8 5.4 5.0 4.8 6.2 5.7 5.9 
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 Within-school variation Between-school variation 
English 5.1 4.6 6.8 5.7 5.6 5.4 4.6 6.3 6.0 5.8 
Physics 5.4 4.9 9.7 6.0 5.9 2.8 2.8 3.9 3.2 2.8 
Science 4.3 4.3 6.8 5.6 5.4 5.0 4.4 6.1 5.5 5.5 
PE 5.3 5.2 7.1 6.2 5.6 4.9 4.3 5.9 5.5 5.5 
MFL 5.6 5.0 7.4 6.5 5.9 3.9 4.1 5.0 5.3 4.6 
Note: Figures based on final analysis sample described in Appendix 2, for teachers below the top of their pay range only, with “all else equal” across adjacent 
years. The dashed line shows the first year of the reform. The dotted line shows the first year pay would be affected by the reform. The sample of academy 
schools changes over years are more schools convert to academy status. Subject refers to secondary school teachers only. Not all ethnic groups or 
secondary subjects have been included in the table. 
Source: Longitudinal SWC. 
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4.5. Summary 
 
This section has shown that there have been changes in the annual pay award of 
teachers’ over time, all else being equal (which is defined in Appendix 3.4.). This section 
has demonstrated that the level and variation of annual change in nominal pay between 
2010-to-2011 and 2014-to-2015 have been affected by the STRB recommendations for 
uplifting pay and consequent changes in the STPCD, in addition to any effect of the 
reforms to teachers’ pay. For example, the proportion of teachers receiving 1-2% growth 
increases from the period of pay restraint to 2012-to-2013. This then declines in 
subsequent years, in line with changes in the STRB recommendations that the 1% 
inflation increase is mandatory to only those at the minimum and maximum of the pay 
range, rather than all classroom teachers. 
More broadly across the (now reference) spine points, there is indicative evidence that 
schools are still awarding annual increases in line with these, verifying the statement by 
the NAHT to the STRB that its members have ‘largely chosen to continue to use the 
existing pay scales and points that existed in STPCD 2013’ (NAHT 2015). However, the 
increase in variation around these reference spine points suggests that at least some 
schools have moved away from using these reference points. 
The increase in variation in annual changes in nominal pay is also evident through the 
decline in the use of reference spine points for annual pay growth. The largest decline is 
for teachers on the bottom of the main pay range, where there is a drop of around 16 
percentage points in the percentage of teachers who received an increase in nominal 
base pay in line with the previously used (now reference) spine points over the period, 
from 74% in 2010-to-2011 to 58% in 2014-to-2015.  
Consistent with this, there is evidence that the within- and between-school variance of 
teachers’ pay awards increased after the reform.  
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5. Annual mobility of teachers across schools 
One prominent feature of the pay reforms was the relaxation of pay portability, meaning 
that schools could choose to pay teachers less than their pay at their previous school. A 
change in the movement of teachers across schools would be expected as a result of the 
reforms, if teachers choose to work in schools depending on their pay policies. The 
retention of teachers in state-funded schools may decrease if the pay reforms 
encouraged some (lower performing) teachers to leave. This section therefore presents 
the annual level of movement across schools and from the state sector, with a special 
focus on the proportion of teachers that move between state-funded schools to an 
equivalent post to a lower level of base pay (measured by a decrease in their reference 
spine point). To give context to these results, this section also shows the proportion of 
teachers that move between state-funded schools to an equivalent post to a lower 
reference spine point and decrease in nominal pay.   
5.1. Percentage of teachers that leave their school 
Table 13 shows the percentage of teachers that leave their school between the current 
and next academic year, either moving schools within the state-funded sector in England, 
or leaving the state sector in England. Note that this definition would define teachers that 
leave the workforce temporarily (for example for a career break due to family 
circumstances) as leaving the state sector between years.13 There is an increase over 
the period, for all school types and subjects. The proportion of teachers that leave their 
school is similar for primary and secondary schools, around 12% between 2010 and 
2011 and around 18% between 2014 and 2015. Female teachers are slightly less likely 
to leave their school than male teachers, across all years, but the proportion increases by 
a similar amount for male and female teachers. It is difficult to conclude whether the 
increase in the proportion of teachers leaving their school is due to the pay reform, or the 
general trend to lower teacher retention. This is because the proportion of teachers 
leaving increases year on year, which suggests a general trend in mobility/retention. 
Other potential sub-groups of movers, for example by ethnicity or subject, are not 
reported, as sample sizes are too low to allow secure inference. 
  
                                            
13 Note that this will be higher than the Rate of Leavers to Other Schools used by the DFE in ‘Schools 
workforce in England 2010 to 2015’ (2016) as it includes leavers from the sector. The Rate of Leavers to 
Other Schools is calculated by dividing the headcount of all teachers who either leave to go to a different 
school or become centrally employed by the total headcount of all qualified teachers. This excludes 
teachers who leave a school by; leaving the sector, retiring, or dying. In addition, nursery schools are 
excluded from the sample used in this report.  
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Table 13 Percentage of teachers that leave their school between the current and next academic year 
 2010- 2011 2011- 2012 2012- 2013 2013- 2014 2014- 2015 
All 12.0 13.5 15.3 17.5 20.0 
Primary 11.6 13.6 15.3 17.5 19.7 
Secondary 12.2 13.3 15.2 17.5 20.3 
Main pay range 13.2 15.2 17.5 20.3 23.0 
Upper pay range 9.5 10.7 12.3 14.3 16.1 
Male 13.2 14.9 16.7 19.3 21.7 
Female 11.6 13.0 14.8 17.0 19.5 
Note: Figures based on final analysis sample described in Appendix 2, for teachers only. The dashed line 
shows the first year of the reform. The dotted line shows the first year pay and mobility would be affected 
by the reform.  
Source: Longitudinal SWC. 
5.2. Percentage of teachers that move schools 
Table 14 shows the percentage of teachers that move school between years, to explore 
whether the increase shown in Table 13 is entirely due to teachers leaving the state-
funded sector (between years). There is an increase in the proportion of teachers that 
move schools within the state-funded sector in England over the period, for all school 
types, almost doubling from 4.8% to 8.5% for the whole sample. This suggests that at 
least some of the increase in the percentage leaving their current school across years is 
due to an increase in the percentage of teachers moving across schools. Again, this 
trend is difficult to attribute to the pay reforms, as there is no specific jump coinciding with 
the first year of the reform. 
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Table 14 Percentage of teachers that move schools between the current and next academic year 
 2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-2013 2013-2014 2014-2015 
All 4.8 6.3 7.4 8.5 8.5 
Primary 5.5 7.0 8.0 9.0 8.8 
Secondary 4.2 5.6 6.8 8.0 8.1 
Main pay range 6.6 8.6 10.0 11.1 10.8 
Upper pay range 2.9 3.9 5.0 6.2 6.3 
Male 5.1 6.8 8.2 9.4 9.4 
Female 4.7 6.1 7.2 8.2 8.2 
Note: Figures based on final analysis sample described in Appendix 2, for teachers only. The dashed line 
shows the first year of the reform. The dotted line shows the first year pay and mobility would be affected 
by the reform.  
Source: Longitudinal SWC. 
5.3. Percentage of teachers that move schools to a lower 
reference spine point 
Table 15 shows the proportion of teachers that move schools to a lower reference spine 
point, of those that move schools, and have all other characteristics equal across years.14 
Of those that move schools and have “all else equal”, there is a large jump in the 
percentage that have a lower reference spine point after the reform, from 7.8% in 2012-
to-2013, to 13.8% in 2013-to-2014. Although it is not possible to conclude that this 
increase was definitely due to the reform, it is consistent with this hypothesis. This 
provides some suggestion that at least some schools relaxed pay-portability, and that the 
pay reforms may have led to an increase in movement to a lower reference spine point. 
This report cannot definitively say why this is occurring, but the change could be due to a 
range of reasons: from teachers using this increased flexibility to move to schools that 
are more desirable despite having lower pay, to teachers with lower effectiveness moving 
to less attractive schools. The change is most notable for teachers on the upper pay 
range, where 18.6% of teachers that moved in 2014-to-2015 moved to an equivalent role 
at a lower reference spine point. Again it should be noted that this could be an artefact of 
the changes to how the data is collected. This might suggest that teachers on this pay 
range are more likely to accept a lower salary for a better school match. It is important to 
note that this change affects a small proportion of teachers overall, equivalent to less 
than 1% of all teachers.  
                                            
14 This restriction on the sample is made to isolate movements across state-funded schools to a lower 
salary while all other characteristics of the role remain the same. “All else equal” is defined as moving to a 
job with the same definition of “post” and QTS status. 
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Table 15 Percentage of teachers that move schools to an equivalent post between the current and 
next academic year to a lower (now reference) spine point 
 2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-2013 2013-2014 2014-2015 
All 4.9 3.7 7.8 17.6 13.8 
Primary 3.9 3.5 7.7 18.5 15.4 
Secondary 6.0 4.0 7.9 16.6 12.0 
Main pay range 2.2 2.0 4.8 12.9 11.6 
Upper pay range 10.8 7.4 13.7 26.7 18.6 
Male 5.2 3.6 7.5 16.3 11.9 
Female 4.7 3.7 7.9 18.0 14.4 
Note: Figures based on final analysis sample described in Appendix 2, for teachers that move schools to 
an equivalent role between the current and adjacent period only. The dashed line shows the first year of 
the reform. The dotted line shows the first year pay and mobility would be affected by the reform. 
Source: Longitudinal SWC. 
 
Teachers that change schools and move to a lower reference spine point do not always 
experience a fall in nominal base pay, as reference spine points rise by 1% each 
academic year. Table 16 replicates Table 15 but now reports only the percentage of 
teachers that move schools to an equivalent post to a lower reference spine point and 
have lower nominal base pay (full-time equivalent base pay). In the pre-reforms period 
the proportions are very similar, meaning that moving to a lower spine point resulted in a 
lower base salary. Table 16 shows that after the reform, there was an increase in the 
proportion of teachers moving to lower nominal pay, but that this was less marked than 
the increase in the proportion of moves to lower (now reference) spine points (shown in 
Table 15). This means that with the increase in pay flexibility, a large proportion of those 
moving schools to a lower reference spine point will have the same or higher nominal 
base pay. For example, in 2013-to-2014, 16.6% of secondary teachers who moved 
schools moved to a lower reference spine point (all else equal), but only 8.3% of the 
same movers experienced a drop in nominal base pay. Similarly, for teachers in the 
upper pay range, 26.7% of movers in that year were classified as on a lower reference 
spine point in their new school, but only 14.8% experienced a fall in nominal base pay. 
Approximately half of movers to a lower spine point in 2013-to-2014 and 2014-to-2015 
did not experience a fall in base pay, which is true regardless of gender. Table 15 and 
Table 16 are consistent in showing that the timing of the pay reforms, coincides with an 
increase in the proportion of teachers that move between state-funded schools (all else 
equal) receiving lower pay. The difference over time is amplified when considering 
movements to a lower reference spine point (Table 15), as moves to an equivalent 
nominal base pay (or nominal base pay less than 1% higher) would be classified as 
movement to a lower reference spine point.  
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Table 16 Percentage of teachers that move schools to an equivalent post between the current and 
next academic year to a lower (now reference) spine point and lower nominal base pay (full-time 
equivalent base pay) 
 2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-2013 2013-2014 2014-2015 
All 4.7 3.6 5.5 8.9 7.4 
Primary 3.8 3.3 5.6 9.5 8.4 
Secondary 5.9 3.9 5.5 8.3 6.2 
Main pay range 2.1 1.9 3.4 5.9 4.7 
Upper pay range 10.6 7.1 9.7 14.8 12.5 
Male 5.1 3.4 5.3 8.2 6.1 
Female 4.6 3.6 5.6 9.2 7.8 
Note: Figures based on final analysis sample described in Appendix 2, for teachers that move schools to 
an equivalent role between the current and adjacent period only. The dashed line shows the first year of 
the reform. The dotted line shows the first year pay and mobility would be affected by the reform.  
Source: Longitudinal SWC. 
5.4. Summary 
This section has indicated that the pay reforms may have increased the percentage of 
teachers that move schools to an equivalent role but at a lower reference spine point, 
presumably as a result of some schools relaxing pay portability. This is partly driven by 
the abolishment of spine points (although reference spine points are produced by 
teachers’ unions), as around half of the teachers that move to a lower reference spine 
point have the same nominal base pay as in their previous post. This suggests that 
schools’ behaviour has changed due to the reform; there is an increase in the proportion 
of teachers moving to a lower nominal base pay, and an even larger increase in the 
proportion of teachers moving to a lower reference spine point (suggesting a movement 
away from the use of reference spine points). There are increases in the percentage of 
teachers leaving their school each year, and increases in the percentage of teachers 
moving between state-funded schools in England each year, but these patterns are more 
consistent with a general time trend than effect of the reform. 
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6. Annual progression from main to upper pay range 
This final section explores the change in rate of progression from main to upper pay 
range since the reform, which it is hypothesised would change as a result of the change 
in requirements for the threshold test.  
Table 17 shows that across the sample as a whole, there is a roughly constant 
percentage of teachers from the main pay range progressing to upper pay range, 
although there is some variation across years, with a higher proportion in 2013-to-2014.  
This pattern is also true for primary and secondary schools, where the proportion is 
higher in 2013-to-2014, but the level remains higher in secondary than primary schools 
throughout the period. The difference in rates of progression across primary and 
secondary teachers could reflect more flexibility in secondary schools’ budgets, allowing 
a higher proportion of teachers to be on the upper pay range, or alternatively a higher 
churn of teachers on the upper pay range in secondary schools, as proportionally more 
become school leaders each year.  
Teachers in academy schools are less likely than teachers in non-academy schools to 
progress from the main to upper pay range at the start of the period, but more likely at 
the end of the period, particularly in 2013-to-2014. The rest of England has a slightly 
higher rate of progression compared to London pay regions, and this difference has been 
constant over time (the exception being Fringe London becoming more similar to the rest 
of England). 
As expected, those at the top of the main pay range are more likely to receive 
progression to the upper pay range than those below the top, although those below the 
top have the largest growth in progression across the period (2.7% to 7.8%). This 
possibly reflects more flexibility in teachers’ pay in progression as a result of the reform, 
as teachers are less rigidly paid according to typical reference spine point and pay range 
progression. 
There are few differences across teachers with different characteristics. For example, 
male, female, White British, Black and Asian teachers have similar rates of progression 
from the main to upper pay range across all years. The reforms do not therefore seem to 
have disproportionately affected one demographic group of teachers more than another. 
There are some differences between teachers of different subjects, where the rate of 
progression from main to upper pay range is typically lowest for maths and science 
teachers. These differences across subjects could be due to differences in the proportion 
of teachers at the top of the pay range, but the precise mechanism through which the 
reforms would affect progression for different subjects is unclear. 
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Table 17 Annual progression from main to upper pay range  
 2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-2013 2013-2014 2014-2015 
All 12.9 11.9 12.0 13.4 12.6 
Primary 11.5 10.4 10.1 11.7 10.6 
Secondary 14.5 13.7 14.3 15.8 15.4 
Academy 12.1 12.7 13.6 14.2 13.6 
Non-academy 12.9 11.7 11.4 13.1 12.0 
Inner London 10.5 11.0 10.9 12.6 11.2 
Outer London 10.9 11.2 11.0 12.0 11.1 
Fringe London 11.6 10.5 9.4 11.6 13.2 
Rest of England 13.5 12.2 12.5 13.9 12.9 
At top of pay range 35.5 33.1 31.8 32.5 33.2 
Below top of pay range 2.7 2.5 3.3 6.1 7.8 
Male 13.6 12.7 13.0 13.0 13.1 
Female 12.7 11.6 11.7 13.6 12.4 
White 13.0 12.0 12.1 13.7 12.7 
Black 12.6 12.7 13.4 13.6 12.8 
Asian 11.8 11.7 11.6 12.2 12.3 
Maths 13.6 11.8 12.4 13.6 13.7 
English 14.3 12.9 13.6 15.9 14.5 
Physics 15.7 13.8 16.5 19.4 15.3 
Science 13.2 12.8 12.8 14.2 13.6 
PE 14.4 14.9 17.4 19.4 17.9 
MFL 15.8 13.6 13.2 15.3 12.2 
Note: Figures based on final analysis sample described in Appendix 2, for teachers below the top of their 
pay range only. The dashed line shows the first year of the reform. The dotted line shows the first year pay 
would be affected by the reform. The sample of academy schools changes over years are more schools 
convert to academy status. Subject refers to secondary school teachers only. Not all ethnic groups or 
secondary subjects have been included in the table. 
Source: Longitudinal SWC. 
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7. Conclusion 
PRP was introduced in England, citing research showing that teacher effectiveness is a 
key determinant of pupil progress, particularly for disadvantaged pupils, and that teacher 
quality can be improved where appraisal systems provide effective incentives to teachers 
(DfE, 2012). The first necessary step for teacher effectiveness to increase as a result of 
these reforms, is for schools to use their new powers to introduce meaningful PRP. 
Assuming that there is variation in teacher quality within and across schools, this would 
be reflected in increased variation in teachers’ pay, and/or more effective teachers 
remaining in the sector following the reform.  
This report demonstrates that the variation in teachers’ annual pay awards since the 
reforms (up to November 2015) has increased, although not universally. Across all 
schools, it is clear that the majority still award annual pay increases (where given) in line 
with the reference spine points that defined teachers’ pay before the reform. However, 
there is evidence of increasing dispersion around these reference levels of pay growth, 
which suggests increasing pay flexibility in at least some schools. There is variation in the 
use of reference spine points across the country. Some LAs have around 60% of 
teachers with annual pay awards consistent with movement up the reference spine 
points, compared to other LAs with less than 10%. This is consistent with schools in 
some areas still largely referring to the reference spine points produced by teachers’ 
unions to determine teachers’ pay awards, with schools in other areas moving away from 
this (as recommended by the STRB). The reason for these differences, such as 
existence of template pay policy documents in these LAs, could be explored in future 
research. Flexibility in pay and annual pay awards is also evident through an increasing 
percentage of teachers progressing to the upper pay range from below the top of the 
main pay range. There is an emerging pattern of increasing variation in annual pay 
awards within and across schools. 
These increases in the variation of teachers’ pay awards occur despite the average level 
of teachers’ pay increasing only marginally across the period of interest (and indeed 
declining slightly in real terms). As the variation in pay growth has increased, this 
suggests that some teachers are experiencing lower levels of nominal pay increases than 
before the reform, while others are experiencing higher levels of nominal pay increases.  
Another aspect of the reforms meant that schools were no longer required to match a 
teacher’s previous salary as a teacher when employing them. There is evidence 
consistent with ‘pay portability’ being removed by at least some schools from observing 
the movement of teachers across schools. The proportion of teachers that move schools 
to a lower salary increases after the reform, from under 6% of teachers moving to an 
equivalent role in 2012-to-2013 to around 15% in 2013-to-2014, but this still affects only a 
small proportion of teachers. Around half of this increase is due to movements to the 
same (or slightly higher) nominal base pay, but where the reference spine point has 
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increased by more. For movement across schools in general, and leaving the state-
funded sector in England, there are increases over time that are indistinguishable from 
general time trends. This makes it difficult to conclude whether or not the reforms have 
affected the size and composition of the teacher workforce.  
The introduction of PRP for teachers was accompanied by concerns that the pay awards 
and progression between the main and upper pay range for female teachers relative to 
male teachers, and ethnic minority teachers relative to White British teachers would be 
unfairly disadvantaged. Are these equity concerns justified? This report has documented 
the patterns in the level and variation of teachers’ pay and the level and variation in 
annual pay awards for these subgroups of teachers throughout. From these statistics, 
there is little evidence that particular groups have been disadvantaged as a result of the 
reforms to teachers’ pay in aggregate. However, more in-depth research, which would 
take account of the distribution of teachers across teacher pay regions and school types, 
would be required to state this conclusively. 
The longitudinal SWC has provided the opportunity to study teachers’ and leaders’ pay 
and annual changes in nominal pay between 2010 and 2015, using a sample of most 
primary and secondary schools in England. The analysis presented in this report 
therefore provides representative and comprehensive information to policy makers about 
the impact of the reforms to date, and potential areas to explore in future.  
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Appendix 
1. Introduction to Appendix  
The longitudinal SWC is created internally by the DfE by linking teachers and leaders 
across waves of the annual SWC. Unlike the annual SWC, each record is a de-identified 
individual rather than role, so that each record contains information about all roles held. 
This appendix contains information about the steps taken to derive a final analysis 
dataset from the dataset received from the DfE.  
2. Sample selection and summary statistics 
The coding of base pay and growth variables to require ‘all else equal’ already implies 
some implicit selection to the final analysis sample. For example, those with exceptionally 
large or small values of base pay are excluded. Additional sample restrictions are: 
• Include only schools classified as primary and secondary schools 
• Exclude special schools, LA nursery schools, pupil referral units, studio schools 
and university technical colleges.  
• Include only schools with more than 50% of (recoded) base pay observed. 
• Include individuals aged 22 and above and 62 and below. These values 
correspond to the 1st and 99th percentile of the age distribution for teachers and 
leaders. 
• Include individuals who work at least five hours per week and at least five weeks 
per year.  
The impact of these sample restrictions on the final sample used for analysis is given in 
Table 18 below. Summary statistics for the final sample are presented in Table 19 and 
Table 20 below. 
3. Data cleaning 
This section describes in detail the steps taken to create the final SWC dataset used for 
analysis. The main steps required are described in turn below. These are: 
1. Creating consistent school identifiers over time 
2. Cleaning base pay 
3. Cleaning additional pay 
4. Defining teachers and leaders with “all else equal” between one year and the next 
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Full syntax in Stata ‘do’ file format is available from the authors on request.  
Table 18 The impact of sample restrictions on the number of individuals and schools used in 
analysis 
Sample restriction N  
schools 
N 
teachers*years 
N 
leaders*years 
None 20,115 2,529,811 393,298 
Non-missing base pay 20,114 2,500,771 391,296 
Non-missing adjusted base pay 20,114 2,486,700 388,616 
Primary and secondary schools only 18,637 2,283,148 343,630 
Exclude special schools, LA nursery 
schools, pupil referral units, studio 
schools and university technical 
colleges 18,637 2,281,193 343,153 
Include only schools with more than 
50% of (adjusted) base pay observed 18,491 2,263,782 340,735 
Include individuals aged 22 and above 
and 62 and below 18,491 2,235,920 337,780 
Include individuals who work at least 5 
hours per week and at least 5 weeks 
per year 18,491 2,220,461 337,035 
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Table 19 Number of teachers across school and teacher types 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Total 364,182 363,188 371,640 372,096 376,030 373,325 
Primary 175,130 177,310 183,319 186,670 192,107 193,982 
Secondary 189,052 185,878 188,321 185,426 183,923 179,343 
Academy 15,288 68,060 105,655 125,585 140,326 149,347 
Non-Academy 348,894 295,128 265,985 246,511 235,704 223,978 
Inner London 27,918 27,752 28,409 29,176 30,283 30,215 
Outer London 27,758 27,729 28,590 28,672 28,770 28,488 
Fringe London 25,552 25,914 26,548 26,601 26,710 26,805 
Rest of England 282,954 281,793 288,093 287,647 290,267 287,817 
Main pay range (MPR) 157,930 155,595 161,037 165,463 171,554 170,499 
Upper pay range (UPR) 189,521 191,382 194,768 191,689 186,558 182,857 
Top of MPR  49,065 48,040 49,421 44,826 29,356 15,099 
Middle of MPR 84,843 84,077 84,164 88,172 91,463 106,596 
Bottom of MPR 23,008 22,490 26,294 27,137 31,102 29,901 
Top of UPR 100,755 99,787 101,401 92,956 63,093 67,249 
Middle of UPR 39,939 40,175 40,948 41,973 52,842 51,958 
Bottom of UPR 47,466 50,641 51,657 50,386 48,898 44,586 
Male 86,961 85,954 87,364 86,705 86,911 86,209 
Female 277,049 276,882 283,908 285,196 288,917 286,961 
White British 310,573 308,521 314,149 311,832 312,233 305,190 
Black 7,009 6,776 6,879 6,914 7,051 7,230 
Asian 12,123 12,305 13,010 13,520 14,278 14,769 
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 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Maths majority subject 15,747 17,134 18,148 18,461 18,708 18,837 
English majority subject 17,164 18,602 19,638 20,028 20,288 20,069 
Physics majority subject 965 1,127 1,220 1,336 1,386 1,338 
Science majority subject 11,704 12,456 12,810 12,649 12,621 12,040 
PE majority subject 19,342 20,920 21,806 21,921 21,850 21,409 
MFL majority subject 9,429 10,264 10,708 10,701 10,499 10,189 
Primary: Academy 313 3,946 11,126 20,197 28,662 35,303 
Primary: Non-Academy 174,817 173,364 172,193 166,473 163,445 158,679 
Primary: Top of MPR 27,795 27,882 29,037 27,133 17,992 9,524 
Primary: Middle of MPR 43,169 43,395 43,913 47,545 52,236 64,149 
Primary: Bottom of MPR 12,363 12,313 15,289 16,791 19,096 18,688 
Primary: Top of UPR 38,573 38,781 39,102 35,437 24,466 25,291 
Primary: Middle of UPR 21,403 21,443 21,618 21,064 22,601 22,849 
Primary: Bottom of UPR 25,906 27,574 28,363 28,280 26,747 24,860 
Inner London: White 
British 
15,567 15,633 15,998 16,492 16,955 16,236 
Inner London: Black  2,931 2,853 2,845 2,841 2,913 2,983 
Inner London: Asian 2,774 2,808 2,886 3,112 3,221 3,301 
Outer London: White 
British 
19,205 19,059 19,537 19,200 18,675 18,076 
Outer London: Black 1,438 1,416 1,453 1,501 1,566 1,643 
Outer London: Asian 2,201 2,216 2,352 2,492 2,717 2,817 
 
 
 
  
76 
 
Table 20 Number of leaders across school and teacher types 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Total 53,645 53,532 55,008 56,311 58,768 59,771 
Primary 34,592 34,914 35,718 36,711 38,237 39,381 
Secondary 19,053 18,618 19,290 19,600 20,531 20,390 
Academy 1,766 6,902 11,570 14,907 18,094 20,370 
Non-Academy 51,879 46,630 43,438 41,404 40,674 39,401 
Inner London 4,043 4,096 4,247 4,493 4,804 5,059 
Outer London 3,520 3,527 3,655 3,874 4,184 4,286 
Fringe London 3,478 3,482 3,585 3,701 3,872 4,040 
Rest of England 42,604 42,427 43,521 44,243 45,908 46,386 
Male 18,415 18,055 18,421 18,547 18,991 18,969 
Female 35,219 35,445 36,559 37,749 39,742 40,793 
White British 48,876 48,733 49,812 50,515 52,342 52,583 
Black 582 617 639 692 740 762 
Asian 811 882 951 1,044 1,170 1,274 
Primary: Academy 59 726 2,084 3,889 5,689 7,353 
Primary: Non-Academy 34,533 34,188 33,634 32,822 32,548 32,028 
Inner London: White 
British 
2,767 2,849 2,876 3,060 3,272 3,352 
Inner London: Black  331 328 350 363 380 402 
Inner London: Asian 208 226 243 268 283 322 
Outer London: White 
British 
2,885 2,843 2,951 3,085 3,238 3,268 
Outer London: Black 93 104 100 120 148 157 
Outer London: Asian 137 146 159 163 202 228 
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3.1. Creating consistent school identifiers over time 
School identifiers can change over time, most commonly if a school changes status from 
LA-maintained to not LA-maintained (academy). This causes problems for the analysis, 
where one question of interest is whether the reforms led to changes in the mobility of 
teachers and leaders across schools. A “stable” identifier is therefore created, which in 
practice is the most recently recorded unique reference number (URN) in the linked data 
available through Edubase (accessed on 11/01/2016). This linked data records all known 
cases of “parent” and “child” schools, where the parent is typically the LA maintained 
school and child is typically the not LA-maintained school. Wherever a “child” is identified 
in the longitudinal SWC data the school identifier is replaced with the “parent”, which 
leads to a stable identifier across the period.  
3.2. Cleaning full-time equivalent nominal base pay 
Full-time equivalent nominal base pay (referred to as base pay in this section) is 
observed for the majority of teachers and leaders in the longitudinal SWC. At the school 
level, 90% of schools have complete records of base pay for all teachers and leaders, 
rising to 96% once teachers and leaders paid a daily rate rather than base pay are 
excluded. There are problems observed with base pay where it is recorded, however. A 
number of steps have been taken to correct for clear cases of miscoding or mis-entry of 
base pay information. In turn, these steps are: 
• Replace base pay with base pay/10 if the original value is large (above £70,000 for 
teachers and £120,000 for leaders) and the recoded variable is in line with adjacent 
values of base pay (within 18%)15.  
• Replace base pay with missing if base pay is large (defined as above) and the 
original and recoded value (when divided by 10) is out of line with adjacent values 
(more than 18% difference). 
• Replace base pay with missing if there are exceptionally large values, even if 
consistent with adjacent values. Exceptionally large values are defined as 
£250,000 for leaders and £115,000 for teachers. 
• Replace base pay with missing where the hourly pay is equivalent to less than £7 
per hour, which is less than the hourly rate for unqualified teachers in England.  
• Replace base pay with missing where the hours worked per week are less than 
0.33 hours per week.  
  
                                            
15 These cut-offs are based on the maximum growth across two spine points (around 18%) and the 
maximum pay range for teachers and leaders in maintained schools, which were £65,978 in 2015/16 for 
leading practitioners (teachers) and £114,437 in 2015/16 for head teachers.  
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3.3. Cleaning additional pay 
Total additional pay is created from summing four components of additional pay: SEN 
allowances, recruitment and retention allowances, teaching and learning responsibilities, 
and other. All components are adjusted to be full-time equivalent. For example the 
additional payment for a teacher working 0.5 full-time equivalent and in receipt of an 
additional payment of £1,000 would be £2,000. Note that General Teaching Council 
for England (GTC) additional payments are not included for any years, as these 
payments are not relevant after 2012. As for full-time equivalent nominal base pay, 
decisions are taken to remove observations that are likely to be miscoded in the original 
longitudinal SWC. Each component of total additional pay is recoded to missing if the 
value recorded in the SWC is larger than the maximum defined in the School Teachers' 
Pay and Conditions Document (2015), and the individual has no other “high” value of 
additional pay in any other year. The annual limits for a classroom teacher are between 
£7,546 and £12,770 for TLR1 allowances, £2,613 and £6,386 for TLR2 allowances, £517 
and £2,577 for TLR3 allowances and £2,064 and £4,075 for SEN allowances. TLR 
payments are therefore recoded to missing if the value is greater than £16,000 and there 
is no other recorded value above £10,000. SEN payments are therefore recorded to 
missing if the value is greater than £5,000 and there is no other recorded value above 
£3,500. There are no such limits for the other components of total additional pay.  
3.4. Defining teachers and leaders with “all else equal” between years 
To consider the changes in teacher and leader pay across years, and classify 
observations as an outlier or otherwise, it is necessary to create an indicator of whether 
everything else is equal for the teacher/leader over the adjacent period. An individual is 
defined as “all else equal” across two periods if: 
• The staff matching reference numbers are identical 
• There is a difference in one between SWC census years. This means that 
individuals that have left and re-entered the state education sector are excluded 
from the analysis. 
• The school of employment is identical 
• Qualified Teacher Status (QTS) is unchanged 
• Post recorded is unchanged 
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3.5. Definitions for key variables 
Definition of reference spine point and following definitions: 
• Spine point is not recorded in the longitudinal SWC, despite being in operation up 
to 2012, and provided for reference in the 2013 STRB report. Reference spine 
points are still produced by teaching unions, however, which extrapolate from 
STRB guidelines for the minimum and maximum of the pay ranges to provide 
annual reference points within pay ranges. 
• Estimated spine point is created in the SWC by coding the minimum and maximum 
of each spine point (or reference spine point) and placing the observation in the 
spine point where base pay falls.  
• Note that this is done according to a FTE equivalent version of base pay, as 
throughout the report. 
• Those classified as at the “top” of the pay range have base pay that falls within the 
penultimate and ultimate values of the spine point for that pay range. Similarly, 
those classified as at the “bottom” of the pay range have base pay that falls within 
the lowest and second lowest spine point values. 
• Whether the individual receives the “expected level of increase in nominal base 
pay” across adjacent periods is therefore defined according to the starting spine 
point and spine point in the adjacent period. This accounts for differences in growth 
between spine points in different parts of the pay ranges, across years, and across 
teacher pay regions. 
Definition of changes in school across years: 
• Coded as changing school if the consistent school identifier across adjacent time 
periods is different and staff matching reference number is the same.  
• Coded as changing schools or leaving the state education system if the consistent 
school identifier across adjacent time periods is different and staff matching 
reference number is the same (as above) OR the staff member is not observed in 
any other school in the adjacent year. 
• Coded as changing schools to a lower reference spine point if the staff member is 
observed to change schools (defined as above) AND has a lower recorded 
reference spine point in the adjacent period in the new school. 
• Coded as changing schools to a lower reference spine point and lower nominal 
base pay if the staff member is observed to change schools (defined as above) 
AND has a lower recorded reference spine point in the adjacent period in the new 
school (as defined above) AND has a lower recorded nominal base pay in the new 
school.
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